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Flying Above the Law and Below the
Radar: Instilling a Taxpaying Ethos in
Those Playing by Their Own Rules
Richard Lavoie*
These days it really does seem like “only the little people
pay taxes.”1  Whether they are from the world of politics,2
sports,3 or entertainment,4 the elites of this country are demon-
* Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law; Dartmouth College,
A.B.; Cornell University, J.D.; New York University, LL.M. (Taxation).
1. This statement is reputed to have been uttered by hotel magnate Leona
Helmsley. See Jeffrey L. Yablon, As Certain as Death – Quotations About Taxes
(2008 Ed.), TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 8, 2008, available at 2008 TNT 5-23 (part 2)
(LEXIS) (attributing quoted language to Leona Helmsley); Maid Testifies Helmsley
Denied Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1989, at B2.
2. The political realm has been vividly on display in 2009 as President Obama
has had to do damage control after several of his Cabinet picks were discovered
having tax problems. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Laura Meckler & Naftali
Bendavid, Obama on Defense as Daschle Withdraws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at
A1.  Obama proclaimed that “[u]ltimately it’s important for this administration to
send a message that there aren’t two sets of rules.  You know, one for prominent
people and one for ordinary folks who have to pay their taxes.” Id.  Other high
profile politicians have also recently been reported as having tax problems.  James
V. Grimaldi, Palin Now Owes Taxes on Payments for Nights at Home, State Rules,
WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, at A4 (reporting on Sarah Palin, former Alaska Gover-
nor and 2008 Republican Vice Presidential candidate); Martin Weil, Barry Says
Kidney Issues Kept Him From Filing Taxes, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2009, at B4 (re-
porting on former Washington, D.C. mayor Marion Barry); posting of Gerald F.
Seib to Capital Journal Blog, Rangel Hits Obama Closer to Home, http://
blogs.wsj.com/capitaljournal/2008/12/12/rangel-hits-obama-closer-to-home/ (Dec.
12, 2008, 10:52 EST) (reporting on Rep. Charles Rangel, Chairman, House Ways
and Means Committee).
3. Some of the recent sports personalities reportedly encountering tax
problems include former NBA player Carl Herrera, see United States v. Herrera,
No. 08-50028, 2009 WL 323184 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009); former NFL punter Joseph
Propkop, see Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former NFL Player, Ex-Casino
Owner and Nevada Businessman Indicted in Massive Tax Fraud Scheme (Jan. 29,
2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv09072.htm; and race car driver
and Dancing with the Stars champion Helio Castroneves, see Press Release, Dep’t
of Justice, Indianapolis 500 Winner and Two Others Indicted on Tax Evasion
Scheme (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv08884.htm.
4. Some of the recent entertainment celebrities reportedly dealing with tax
issues include 1995 Best Actor Oscar winner Nicolas Cage, see Neil Weinberg, Ja-
net Novack & William P. Barrett, Nicolas Cage Hits Some Turbulence; An-
637
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strating a penchant for not paying their taxes.5  Nevertheless,
Americans in general continue to exhibit a high degree of tax
compliance.6  Why do most people pay their taxes?  What distin-
guishes them from those who cheat?7  What can we learn from
these differences that could promote greater compliance among
noncompliant segments of the populace?
This Article examines these questions in light of the rele-
vant social science literature.  As a general matter, empirical
research regarding tax compliance finds that the conventional
analysis of compliance in terms of penalties and enforcement
activity only represents a piece of the overall compliance dy-
namic.8  Beyond such deterrence mechanisms, an individual’s
taxpaying behavior is shaped by a wide variety of cultural, in-
stitutional, and individual factors.9  When a confluence of such
factors exists within a society they create a cultural norm in
favor of honoring one’s tax obligations that is persistent and
self-reinforcing, a “taxpaying ethos.”10  This Article highlights
ticorporate Crusaders Shortchanging Their Own Workers?, FORBES, Mar. 10, 2008,
at 28; actor Wesley Snipes, see Actor Snipes Appeals Tax Conviction, WALL STREET
J., May 3, 2008, at A7; pornographic video entrepreneur Joseph Francis, see Josh
Friedman, Raunch Mogul Denies Charges; The IRS Accuses the Producer of the
“Girls Gone Wild” Video Series of Concealing Millions in Income, L.A. TIMES, July
22, 2008, at C3; and Grammy winning blues singer Koko Taylor, see Taylor v.
Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1109 (Feb. 5, 2009) (mem.).
5. Of course, these segments of the population are not the only ones avoiding
their taxpaying obligations. See infra Part IV (discussing in detail self-employed
individuals and small businesses who exhibit very high degrees of noncompliant
behavior).
6. Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) estimates of taxpayer compliance
since the mid-1980s have remained fairly stable at about 82-84%. See, e.g., George
Guttman, IRS Updates Estimates On Individual Tax Gap, TAX NOTES TODAY, May
13, 1996, available at 96 TNT 93-95 (LEXIS) (reporting an 81.5% rate for 1985 and
83% rate for both 1988 and 1992); Dustin Stamper, Everson Pledges to Narrow
Growing Tax Gap, 110 TAX NOTES 807 (2006) (reporting an 84% rate for 2001).
7. This Article focuses primarily on those engaged in intentional tax avoid-
ance, rather than taxpayers who underpay due to mistakes or legitimate uncer-
tainty regarding the appropriate application of the law.
8. See infra Part I; Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (“A widespread view among tax
scholars is that law enforcement does not explain why people pay taxes.”).
9. See infra Part II.
10. As discussed later, see infra Part I.B, this Article coins the phrase “taxpay-
ing ethos” to connote a widely held societal belief that one should not cheat on his
or her taxes.  The tax compliance literature often refers to an analogous concept of
a society’s “tax morale.” See, e.g., Benno Torgler, TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX MO-
RALE: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2007) (exhaustively reviewing the
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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the most relevant factors contributing to the creation of a tax-
paying ethos and utilizes them to create a framework for pro-
moting increased tax compliance among historically reticent
groups of taxpayers.  Part I of this Article reviews the inade-
quacy of the traditional deterrence approach to tax compliance
and contrasts it with the taxpaying ethos explanation.  Part II
examines the empirically identified factors influencing a soci-
ety’s taxpaying commitment.  Part III translates these factors
into general policy prescriptions aimed at cultivating a taxpay-
ing ethos in a society.  Part IV then moves from these general
prescriptions to the more specific question of how the govern-
ment could attempt to utilize this approach to modify the par-
ticular sub-culture of sole proprietors and small business
owners, who constitute a historically noncompliant segment of
our society.  Part V concludes that while our understanding of
how to cultivate a taxpaying ethos is still in its infancy, enough
is known to warrant testing the practical efficacy of the basic
tenets of the theory in the context of a targeted effort to reduce
noncompliance in a traditionally problematic segment of
society.
I. Why Do People Pay Taxes?
A. The Inadequacy of Deterrence Explanations
Up until the late 1980s, most scholars considered the ques-
tion of tax compliance using a deterrence model.11  Under this
empirical studies exploring the nature of tax morale).  For instance, a country with
high tax morale exhibits a relatively low rate of noncompliance with its tax laws,
while a country with low tax morale exhibits fairly widespread tax evasion.  As
commonly used, “tax morale” is a way of referring in the aggregate to all the varied
factors that strongly influence a taxpayer’s voluntary compliance with the tax law.
See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommenda-
tions for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 601 (2007).  Since the focus of this Article is
on how to promote high tax morale within a society or cultural sub-group, it em-
ploys the phrase “taxpaying ethos” to describe the existence of a high tax morale
situation.  Further, using the phrase “ethos” more clearly embodies the idea of a
mere prevailing cultural norm without raising any unintended inferences regard-
ing the morality of paying or not paying the legally imposed taxes.  For instance, it
may be moral to evade legally imposed taxes if they support a brutal dictatorship
where tax revenues are used to torture and enslave the citizenry.
11. See, e.g., John T. Scholz, Trust, Taxes, and Compliance, in TRUST AND GOV-
ERNANCE 135 (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998) (“A decade ago
compliance studies focused primarily on the coercive aspect of government.”); TAX-
3
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approach, citizens paid their taxes primarily out of fear that the
government would catch and penalize them, either with fines or
incarceration.12  This theory analogized tax compliance to the
general economics underlying gambling13 or crime.14  Conse-
quently, the deterrence paradigm was appealing because its ec-
onomics could be readily modeled and seemed to provide clear
policy prescriptions for optimizing penalties and audit rates to
maximize compliance and tax collections.15  For example, under
the basic deterrence model, tax compliance is explained as a
function of the risk of detection and the penalty applied to dis-
covered noncompliance.16  Taxpayers weigh whether the ex-
pected return from cheating on their taxes outweighs the
expected cost of the punishment (i.e., the punishment dis-
counted by the chance of non-detection).  If the benefits out-
weigh the potential penalties, then a rationale wealth-
maximizing taxpayer should cheat.17  As can be readily ob-
PAYER COMPLIANCE (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (providing an
early attempt to seriously examine the underpinnings of tax compliance beyond
traditional deterrence considerations); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan
Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 835 (1998) (stating that there
were only a few empirical studies on tax compliance before 1980); Kornhauser,
supra note 10, at 603 n.2 (“[T]he majority of knowledge in this area [tax morale] R
has occurred only in the past 5-7 years . . . .”).
12. See, e.g., Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A
Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972).
13. Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Eva-
sion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 14 (1986).
14. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1454, 1463 (2003) (“The basic model of tax com-
pliance is based on an economic model of crime advanced by Gary Becker.”). See
generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
15. John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance: Tax Institutions and Tax Morale
in the U.S., in TAX EVASION, TRUST AND STATE CAPACITIES 51, 101 (Nicolas Hayoz
& Simon Hug eds., 2007).
16. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 12. R
17. For instance, if we assume a 50% tax rate, a 1% audit rate, and a 25%
penalty for noncompliance, then a taxpayer faced with the choice of whether to
omit a $20,000 item from her taxable income would compare the following values:
(1) a $9,900 expected benefit ($10,000 x 99% chance of non-detection) from not
paying the tax owed, versus (2) an expected cost of $25 ($10,000 x 25% penalty x
1% chance of detection).  Because the taxpayer’s expected net return is $9,875, a
rational wealth-maximizing taxpayer should omit the income item from his or her
tax return.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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served, this approach ends up prescribing greatly increased
rates of audit and/or very high levels of sanctions.18
The United States exhibits a fairly high degree of tax com-
pliance that appears to have remained stable over at least the
last twenty years.19  The audit rate in the United States is, how-
ever, currently only about 1%20 and the typical understatement
penalty rate is only 20%.21  Consequently, the deterrence model
wildly over-predicts the level of noncompliant behavior based on
these rates.  Some of the discrepancy can be explained by ad-
justing the model to reflect individual perceptional biases.  For
instance, individuals have been shown to systematically overes-
timate the likelihood of a risk that is contingent on multiple fac-
tors, which implies they overestimate their audit risk.22
Similarly, many individuals exhibit a degree of risk aversion,
which could indicate that the net expected benefit from tax
avoidance would need to be significantly above zero before they
would engage in tax-avoidance behavior.  Even when these fac-
tors are crafted into the deterrence model, it persists in predict-
18. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1465.  This can be easily demonstrated using R
the example in the previous footnote.  In order for the taxpayer’s expected net re-
turn from cheating to be zero, either the penalty rate would need to be increased to
9,900% (that is, 99 times the tax deficiency!) or the chance of detection would need
to be 80%.  Intermediate solutions based on adjusting both variables are also possi-
ble.  So, increasing the penalty rate to 100% and raising the risk of detection to
50% would also zero out the taxpayer’s utility from cheating.
19. See supra note 6. R
20. The audit rate for individual returns was 1.03% in 2007, a marked in-
crease from the 0.49% audit rate in 2000.  IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS ENFORCE-
MENT AND SERVICE STATISTICS 3, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
irs_enforcement_and_service_tables_fy_2007.pdf.  Of course the audit rate is
somewhat understated as it omits errors detected by information matching and
other computer screening techniques that are typically rectified through written
correspondence only. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION,
TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 7 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200830095fr.pdf.
21. I.R.C. § 6662 (2006) (levying a 20% penalty rate in most situations).  Of
course the penalty rate increases to 75% for fraud, but that finding requires the
Service to prove an intentional disregard of a known legal duty by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Id. § 6663(a).
22. Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision
Theory and Tax Compliance, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 821, 833 (1991) (“[P]eople con-
sistently overestimate the probability of an outcome which can occur only as the
result of a particular series of events.”).
5
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ing much higher levels of noncompliance than are actually
evident in the United States and other industrialized nations.23
B. A Taxpaying Ethos Explanation
Because the deterrence model fails to accurately predict tax
evasion levels, other forces must be influencing citizens to com-
ply despite the apparently overwhelming economic utility of
cheating.  The hodgepodge of non-coercive forces and behavioral
traits that influence the degree of tax evasion are generally re-
ferred to under the umbrella rubric of a society’s “tax morale.”24
This term serves as a convenient way to refer to the aggregate
counterbalance necessary to bring the deterrence model into
equilibrium with the observed levels of compliance.  The actual
components of tax morale, as well as their relative significance,
remain ill-defined.25  The empirical behavioral and economic re-
search into the nature of tax morale is still in its infancy.26  The
research is further slowed by the relatively rare opportunity to
conduct actual field experiments in conjunction with taxing au-
thorities.27  Consequently, most of the relevant research falls ei-
ther into the category of (1) laboratory experiments designed to
test particular hypotheses regarding the behavior of a represen-
tative group of individuals or (2) statistically analyzed survey
data from representative populations.28
Nevertheless, despite the newness of the inquiry and the
limits of the empirical research techniques, a number of ele-
ments have been identified, and generally accepted, as impor-
23. See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 11, at 846 (noting that mis- R
perceptions of audit rate cannot explain observed compliance rate); Torgler, supra
note 10, at 4 (noting that estimated level of risk aversion in the United States is R
between one and two on the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion scale, while relevant empir-
ical studies indicate a level of thirty would be needed to explain the observed
United States tax compliance rate).
24. See Torgler, supra note 10. R
25. Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 601. R
26. Id.
27. Because such field studies require significant advance preparation and
the cooperation of the taxing authority, and typically involve a significant period of
time before the receipt of the relevant raw data, there are comparatively few such
studies. See Torgler, supra note 10, at 16.  Recently, however, it has been sug- R
gested to the Service that it should establish a “behavioral science unit” to promote
and undertake just this type of research.  Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 626. R
28. See Torgler, supra note 10, at 5-17 (providing an extended discussion of R
the pros and cons of each type of research in the context of tax compliance).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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tant factors in promoting tax compliance.  Before delving into
these factors in Part II below, however, it is important to con-
trast the broad tax morale concept with the conception of a tax-
paying ethos as used in this Article.  Tax morale represents a
conglomeration of factors that have an impact, either positive or
negative depending on the circumstances, on taxpaying atti-
tudes.  In contrast, a taxpaying ethos represents a pervasive
cultural norm that is internalized by members of the society
and therefore strongly influences their behavior in favor of
faithfully complying with the tax laws.  Stated another way,
taxpaying ethos is a descriptive phrase identifying a cultural
dynamic that values adhering to (and disfavors disobeying) the
tax laws, while tax morale refers to the various factors that may
contribute to creating such a taxpaying ethos within a particu-
lar society.29
Because a taxpaying ethos is merely descriptive of a cul-
tural trait, the specific genesis of a taxpaying ethos in a given
society could be as varied as the cultures in which it happens to
arise.  Nevertheless, this Article will present a probable frame-
work on which a taxpaying ethos could take hold, as a means of
better understanding the significance of the most relevant em-
pirically identified tax morale factors described in Part II below.
While the following approach to conceptualizing the founda-
tions of a taxpaying ethos is by no means the only way to ex-
plain the relevance of the research findings, it is a highly
plausible one to posit in the context of a Western democracy.
One of the key failings of the deterrence model is that it
assumes taxpayers will act as rational wealth-maximizers.
People do not, however, act rationally.30  Further, individuals
may eschew pure wealth-maximization strategies when they
perceive that they are in fact receiving a valid quid pro quo in
exchange for their taxes.  In Western democracies tax receipts
are not just hoarded by the government for accumulation’s sake.
29. Of course there is some potential circularity in this explanation of the con-
cepts because once a taxpaying ethos is established, its existence creates cultural
pressures on members of society, which reinforce the existing taxpaying ethos.
Consequently, a taxpaying ethos itself can be a tax morale factor.
30. John S. Carroll, A Cognitive-Process Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance, in
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 229, 234-36  (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989)
(describing some of the behavioral studies indicating that human actions often di-
verge from rational economic utility predictions).
7
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Taxes provide for a wide array of government services that ben-
efit the entire society.  As such, it might be posited that taxpay-
ers generally should be predisposed to paying a fair price (i.e.,
taxes) for the services they receive, which would mitigate some
of the inclination to merely maximize their personal wealth by
cheating on their taxes.  A counter to this supposition is that
most of the government services provided take the form of pub-
lic goods, so there is a large free-rider problem because taxpay-
ers enjoy the benefit of such goods even if they fail to contribute
for them.31  Consequently, the deterrence model generally ig-
nores the existence of a quid pro quo for paid taxes on the the-
ory that individuals will not willingly pay for public goods
absent the threat of being penalized for noncompliance.32
Experimental evidence, however, refutes the deterrence po-
sition.  That is, humans do not necessarily act “rationally” to
maximize their personal wealth when faced with public-good
situations.33  Individuals often make decisions based on heuris-
tics that have worked and benefited them in the past.34  One
such heuristic is based on cooperation and reciprocation.35  As a
31. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523 (1998) (dis-
cussing whether taxes are warranted because of free-rider problems associated
with public goods); John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Re-
search, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 112 (John H. Kagel &
Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (discussing the economic prediction of free-riding).
32. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1477. R
33. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring Social Norms and
Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists 2 (Inst. for
Empirical Res. in Econ., Working Paper No. 97, 2002), available at http://
www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp097.pdf.
34. See Russell Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1127-34 (2000) (providing a systemic discussion of a variety of heuristics and
their influence on human decision-making); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-36
(1974).
35. The existence of this reciprocation heuristic is evidenced by simple “ulti-
matum” experiments. See, e.g., Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd
Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 367 (1982).  In these experiments, subjects are paired up and one (the pro-
poser) is given a sum of money to divide between them.  The proposer has complete
discretion regarding how much of the sum to give to the other subject (the re-
sponder), but if the responder rejects the offer then neither is allowed to keep the
money.  From a purely economic standpoint the responder should accept any
amount proposed since he gets nothing if he rejects it.  Nevertheless, these experi-
ments typically show that the most typical offer is 50/50, the mean offer is approxi-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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result, experiments attempting to replicate the public-good situ-
ation find that people typically cooperate to create and contrib-
ute to the public good despite the wealth-maximizing incentives
to free-ride.36  For instance, assume ten people are each given
$10 and told that they can either keep the money or can contrib-
ute some or all of it into a community fund that will then be
doubled and redistributed equally among them.37  So, if every-
one contributes their full $10, then they maximize their aggre-
gate benefit and each ultimately receives $20.  From an
individual perspective, however, the optimal wealth maximiza-
tion strategy is to contribute nothing.  That is, if one person con-
tributes nothing and the other nine contribute their full $10
stake, each subject receives $18 from the community fund re-
gardless of their contribution, and therefore the free-rider re-
tains $28 rather than the $20 he would have otherwise
retained.  Of course, if everyone free-rides, which would be the
expected result from a pure economic-maximization perspec-
tive, then no public good would be created and each subject
would just retain their $10 stake.  This type of experiment typi-
cally finds that subjects do make contributions despite the
strong economic incentives to free-ride.38  Contrary to the
mately 60/40, and the smaller the offer, the more likely that it is rejected.  Phrased
differently, the average retained by the proposer is usually less than 70% and
about 20% of the offers are rejected.  Jack Ochs & Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental
Study of Sequential Bargaining, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 355 (1989); Alvin E. Roth, In-
troduction to Experimental Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECO-
NOMICS 1, 50 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).  Effectively, the subjects
bring to the experiment a norm of cooperative fair sharing that is generally recog-
nized by the proposer in making his offer and that the responder is willing to en-
force, even at an economic penalty to him.
36. See John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in
THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 112-13 (John H. Kagel & Alvin
E. Roth eds., 1995); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 333, 335-36 (2001).
37. This type of experiment is often used to explore various aspects of public-
good theory. See, e.g., Li–Chen Hsu, Experimental Evidence on Tax Compliance
and Voluntary Public Good Provision, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 205, 205-06 (2008).  While
the example discussed in the text is very simple, this basic experiment can be mod-
ified to be more realistic and specific to the tax arena by adding and controlling for
any number of variables, such as informing subjects of (1) their tax rate versus the
average tax rate, (2) the audit rate, (3) potential penalties, or (4) the number of
“taxpayers” who cheat on, or comply with, their tax obligations.
38. Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 137, 140 (2000).
9
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wealth-maximization prediction of zero, the subjects typically
contribute between 40% and 60% of their initial stake to the
community fund.39  These experiments demonstrate the cooper-
ation heuristic.  This type of experiment is typically continued
for a number of iterations to test how the cooperative behavior
of the subjects changes over time.  Such iterative experiments
demonstrate that many individuals are “conditional coopera-
tors” who start out using a middle-ground cooperative position
and then adjust their behavior to be less or more cooperative
based on the observed actions of others in contributing to the
community fund.40  In this way, the cooperation heuristic can be
seen as a more rational approach to a given situation than a
pure economic wealth-maximizing approach because it provides
overall better results over a wide range of potential situations
by permitting more opportunities for cooperative behavior.41
The apparent existence of such a cooperation heuristic has
led some to posit a fiscal-exchange paradigm in which taxpayers
act as “adaptive contractarians” that will pay their taxes “only if
other taxpayers and the state also meet their obligations to the
implicit tax contract.”42  That is, taxpayers pay because they be-
lieve that they receive a benefit from the government for paying
their taxes, and they are willing to keep paying as long as the
government keeps providing valued services and other citizens
are not shirking their duties.  So, this fiscal-exchange concept,
while certainly not the only approach available, can serve as an
illustrative framework on which a taxpaying ethos could be
built.  Consequently, it is a useful approach to keep in mind to
assist in contextualizing the relevance and operative signifi-
cance of the factors, discussed below in Part II, which seem to
have an important impact on tax compliance.
39. Id.
40. See Joep Sonnemans, Arthur Schram & Theo Offerman, Strategic Behav-
ior in Public Good Games: When Partners Really Become Strangers 9 (Dec. 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Amsterdam), available at
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/strat.pdf.
41. Indeed, studies have shown that people exhibiting greater degrees of con-
ditional cooperation are more successful in prisoner dilemma games than people
who are less trusting of others. See John Orbell & Robyn M. Dawes, A “Cognitive
Miser” Theory of Cooperators’ Advantage, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 524-26 (1991).
42. Scholz, supra note 15, at 105. R
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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II. Uncovering the Foundations of a Taxpaying Ethos
Because levels of observed tax compliance in Western de-
mocracies cannot be explained by the level of penalties and per-
centage of audits conducted, other factors must constitute the
building blocks on which the taxpaying ethos of such countries
is founded.  This section first discusses the role of coercion gen-
erally in promoting tax compliance and fostering a taxpaying
ethos, and then explores some of the more salient non-coercive
forces that have been found to be positively correlated with tax
compliance.
A. Contextualizing the Role of Coercion
As discussed above, the deterrence model does not accu-
rately describe the relationship between penalty and audit
rates and the observed level of tax compliance.  Nevertheless,
that does not mean that the degree of enforcement and punish-
ment is an irrelevant consideration in influencing tax compli-
ance.  Studies have demonstrated that generally tax compliance
does increase as penalties and enforcement activity escalate.43
Further, it is clear that some level of enforcement activity and
associated sanctions is necessary to ensure that individuals
have faith that the tax system is being fairly and evenhandedly
enforced.  Consequently, one might suppose that simply in-
creasing penalties or audit rates would provide a ready means
for increasing tax compliance even though the deterrence model
does not itself fully describe the tax compliance dynamic.
But is there a point where increased coercion yields insig-
nificant compliance benefits?  Or worse, might heightened
levels of coercion become counterproductive in terms of compli-
ance?  In this regard, some have argued that “far from promot-
ing compliance, simply increasing the penalties for evasion has
43. See, e.g., Paul J. Beck, Jon S. Davis & Woonoh Jung, Experimental Evi-
dence on Taxpayer Reporting under Uncertainty, 66 ACCT. REV. 535 (1991); Charles
T. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and the Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns,
65 REV. ECON. STAT. 363 (1983); Mehemiah Friedland, Shlomo Maital & Aryen
Rutenberg, A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 107
(1978); Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Eva-
sion, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 489, 493 (1984); Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Dis-
count: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 15 (1986); Ann D. Witte &
Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Com-
pliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT’L TAX. J. 1 (1985).
11
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been shown to undermine it, at least in societies that otherwise
enjoy relatively compliant norms.”44  However, others have
strongly questioned the validity of such assertions.45  The stud-
ies in this regard are mixed.46  One possible reason for the un-
clear impact may be that while increased coercion has a positive
influence on compliance in isolation, it may also have a negative
impact (or crowding-out effect) on an existing taxpaying ethos,
so any overall impact of increased coercion may be negligible
and may leave the society vulnerable to increased noncompli-
ance if the coercion levels are subsequently reduced.47  In this
regard, a survey of the relevant empirical studies reveals that
typically no significant correlation exists between penalty levels
and audit rates and the level of tax compliance.48  Where signifi-
cant correlations have been found, they tend to show weak posi-
tive correlations for increased enforcement activity, but
negative correlations for increased penalties.49  One explanation
for this can be found by returning to the conditional-cooperator
concept described above.50  Increased audit rates assure taxpay-
44. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s
Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377 (2002). See also Heidi Glenn
& Allen Kenney, Olson: Increased Enforcement Could Erode Taxpayer Trust, TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 11, 2004, available at 2004 TNT 91-3 (LEXIS); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase
Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 95, 97-98 (2005); Togler, supra note
10, at 26. R
45. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1484-87. R
46. See Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psy-
chological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation 9-11
(Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., Working Paper No. 287, 2005), available at http:/
/www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp287.pdf (discussing mixed results found in numerous
studies).
47. In an analogous vein, one study added incentives for cooperation in the
first round of a prisoner’s dilemma game and then removed those incentives in
subsequent rounds of the game.  The study found that the change in incentives
substantially undermined subsequent cooperation and actually left the players
worse off in the second round than a control group that had no positive incentives
in the first game. See Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Experiencing Im-
partiality to Invoke Fairness in the n-PD: Some Experimental Results, 86 PUB.
CHOICE J. 117, 117-35 (1996).
48. See Torgler, supra note 10, at 156-59, 285 (reviewing the relevant experi- R
mental work and analyzing several sets of survey data).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 158 (suggesting audits may be perceived as policing the tax system,
while the penalty rate may be seen as a more evident indication of the need for
external sanctions to obtain compliance, and therefore could crowd out any intrin-
sic motivation to comply).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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ers that a mechanism exists to detect and police against shirk-
ing. Consequently, taxpayers have more confidence in the
system and correspondingly increase their level of cooperation
with it.  That is, just because a lot of audits are conducted does
not necessarily imply that a large percentage of the population
is currently shirking.51  On the other hand, increased penalties
may be seen as evidence that such measures are required to cre-
ate compliance, giving a conditional cooperator reason to believe
that a large number of people are either cheating or would cheat
in the absence of the high sanction.52
Given the uncertain state of the empirical research in this
regard, it does not seem prudent to merely escalate enforcement
activity and penalties in a generally tax compliant society as a
means of promoting increased compliance.  This may not, how-
ever, be true in the context of a noncompliant society.53  Where
a taxpaying ethos exists, it should be self-maintaining due to
the internalization of the cultural norm and the continued oper-
ation of the forces which produced it to begin with.  Conse-
quently, drastically altering the coercion levels runs a risk of
upsetting that equilibrium and would not be warranted based
on the current empirical research.  In the converse situation,
where the cultural norm is noncompliance, increasing the coer-
cion levels could be an effective means of unsettling that cul-
tural equilibrium and prompting the cultural norm to gravitate
toward increased compliance.54  Several commentators have
suggested such a dynamic might exist and that increased en-
forcement could be an effective means of jolting a static noncom-
pliance norm toward a more compliant one.55
The foregoing discussion has indicated that some median
level of coercive activity is likely a prerequisite for creating a
51. However, if increased enforcement activity is publicized as being necessi-
tated by a need to close a large gap between taxes owed and those actually col-
lected, then a negative compliance impact might result since it undermines the
perception of the average taxpayer that compliance is in fact the norm in their
society. Cf. Roberta Mann, Beyond Enforcement: Top 10 Strategies for Encourag-
ing Tax Compliance, 111 TAX NOTES 919, 920 (2006) (suggesting any advertising of
the magnitude of the United States tax gap is counterproductive to actually closing
the tax gap due to its negative behavioral impact on taxpayers).
52. See Torgler, supra note 10, at 158. R
53. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1509-10. R
54. Id.
55. Id.
13
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taxpaying ethos since it demonstrates to taxpayers that the
laws will be fairly and uniformly enforced. Arbitrarily increas-
ing the coercive force in a generally compliant society could,
however, be counterproductive.  Conversely, in a society with an
established noncompliance norm, significantly increased coer-
cive measures may serve to push the established norm out of
equilibrium and provide the foundation for cultivating a taxpay-
ing ethos by demonstrating to individuals that the law is now
being adequately enforced.
B. The Demonstrated Influential Factors
As discussed above, while a threshold level of coercive ac-
tivity is likely a necessary prerequisite to cultivating a taxpay-
ing ethos, the predictive deficiencies of the deterrence model
clearly indicate other forces must also be present.  While the
relevant empirical research on the elements of tax morale is
still in its infancy, this research has identified at least two basic
categories of forces having a significant positive influence on tax
compliance: trust in government and trust in taxpayers.
1. Trust in Government
The first area of significant importance in promoting tax
compliance can be loosely referred to as trust in government.
Or, viewed through the fiscal-exchange lens, is the government
upholding its end of the fiscal-exchange whereby it provides ser-
vices in exchange for taxes being paid?  Within this rubric are
such factors as whether the uses to which taxes are put are seen
as appropriate and of equivalent value to the tax cost, and
whether the tax laws are perceived as representing an equitable
sharing of the tax burden.  A central component of both of these
factors is whether members of society have had input, either
directly by specific public referendums or indirectly by electing
representatives, in making the tax and expenditure decisions.
To the extent citizens participate in the creation of the laws, the
more invested they are in them and the more willing they are to
comply.  Similarly, this “trust in government” category includes
perceptions regarding the fairness and uniformity with which
the laws are enforced.  Consequently, how the administrative
agency charged with collecting the imposed taxes conducts itself
can be a crucial factor in promoting tax compliance.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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A number of studies present empirical evidence that gov-
ernments that adhere to the principle of providing public ser-
vices according to citizen preferences at a reasonable tax cost
achieve more tax compliance.56  Conversely, levels of tax eva-
sion rise more as a citizen’s desires regarding public goods di-
verge from the actual goods, levels, and quality provided.57  As
might therefore be expected, tax compliance also increases with
reductions in perceived government waste.58  In short, where
the perceived exchange between the tax paid and the govern-
ment services performed is seen as equitable, tax compliance is
strengthened.59 If, however, the perceived tax burden is too
56. See, e.g., James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Estimating the
Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data, 45 NAT’L TAX J.
107 (1992); James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Col-
lective Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285
(1993); James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Institutional Uncertainty
and Taxpayer Compliance, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1018 (1992); James Alm, Gary H.
McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay Taxes?, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21
(1992); Thomas M. Porcano, Correlates of Tax Evasion, 9 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 47
(1988); M.W. Spicer & S.B. Lundstedt, Understanding Tax Evasion, 31 PUB. FIN.
295 (1976).
57. Werner W. Pommerehne, Albert Hart & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Morale, Tax
Evasion and the Choice of Policy Instruments in Different Political Systems, 49
PUB. FIN. 52 (Supp. 1994).
58. Feld & Frey, supra note 46, at 15. See Valerie Braithwaite, Communal R
and Exchange Trust Norms: Their Value Base and Relevance to Institutional Trust,
in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 46, 53-54 (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds.,
1998).
59. It should be noted here that an “equitable” tax burden for the provided
services does not necessarily require a one-to-one equivalence for each citizen.
That is, higher taxes may be accepted by some citizens as a contribution to the
benefit of society as a whole.  This might especially be true of wealthy individuals
who may equate their financial success in part to the intangibles of the business
and economic environment fostered by the government’s actions or inactions.  This
conjecture finds support in the empirical studies. See, e.g., A.M. Ali, Economic
Freedom, Democracy and Growth, 13 J. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 1 (1997) (indicating a
high degree of economic freedom in society correlates with higher legal compli-
ance); James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay
Taxes?, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21 (1992) (same); Thorsten Beck, Ross Levsine & Norman
Loayaza, Finance and the Sources of Growth, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (2000) (indicat-
ing strong financial markets correlate with higher legal compliance); Jong Hag
Choi & T.J. Wong, Auditors’ Governance Functions and Legal Environments: An
International Investigation, 24 CONTEMPORARY ACCT. RES. 1 (2007) (same); Bruno
Frey, Direct Democracy: Politico-Economic Lessons From Swiss Experience, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 338 (1994) (indicating legal environment allowing effective competition
correlates with increased legal compliance); B.E. Hermalin, The Effects of Competi-
tion on Executive Behavior, 23 RAND J. ECON. 350 (1992) (same); R. La Porta et al.,
15
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high, then this lessens the commitment to pay and tax evasion
tends to increase, perhaps justified as a type of self-defense.60
Similarly, perceptions regarding the equitable allocation of
the tax burden can impact tax compliance.  Citizens who believe
their share of the tax burden is too high are more likely to at-
tempt to evade that burden as a self-help measure.61  Because
most income tax systems involve some degree of tax rate
progressivity and often represent a form of wealth redistribu-
tion among members of the society, one might conclude that
rate progressivity would have a negative impact on tax compli-
ance, and some experimental evidence supports this view.62
Such negative impacts, however, may be mitigated if those in
the higher tax brackets feel the progressive rate structure is le-
gitimate, for example, because they were indirectly involved in
structuring or approving the progressive rate system.
The empirical data indicates that participation in the for-
mulation of a tax law increases the perceived legitimacy of the
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (indicating strong
financial markets correlate with higher legal compliance).
60. Torgler, supra note 10, at 17. R
61. See, e.g., Wilbur J. Scott & Harold G. Grasmick, Deterrence and Income
Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian Theories, 17 J. AP-
PLIED BEHAV. SCI. 395 (1981) (reporting evidence that deterrence was more effec-
tive for taxpayers who perceived the tax system to be unfair).
62. See, e.g., C. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individ-
ual Returns, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 363 (1983) (finding evidence that evasion in-
creased with both income levels and tax rates); David Joulfaian & Mark Rider, Tax
Evasion in the Presence of Negative Income Tax Rates, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 553 (1996)
(same); Karyl A. Kinsey & Howard G. Grasmick, Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Improve Compliance? Three Studies of Pre- and Post-TRA Compliance Attitudes,
15 L. & POL’Y 239 (1993) (reporting progressive rates increase tax evasion);
Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness and Compli-
ance, 16 L. & POL’Y 27 (1994) (same).  However, the evidence is not unambiguous.
For instance, in a study based on Jamaican data, the surprising result that evasion
declines with marginal tax rates was found.  James Alm, R. Bahl & M.N. Murray,
Audit Selection and Income Tax Underreporting in the Tax Compliance Game, 42
J. DEV. ECON. 1 (1993). See also J.S. Feinstein, An Econometric Analysis of Income
Tax Evasion and its Detection, 22 RAND J. ECON. 14 (1991) (finding a significant
negative correlation between marginal tax rates and evasion).  At least one prob-
lem that may contribute to these mixed results is the difficulty in obtaining data
on evasion.  To control for this problem, several studies have used laboratory ex-
periments where subjects were asked hypothetical questions about their behavior.
See, e.g., P. WEBLEY ET AL., TAX EVASION: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (1991);
James Alm, B.R. Jackson & M. McKee, Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayers
Compliance with Experimental Data, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 107 (1992).  Typically, these
results find a positive association between tax rates and evasion.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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resulting law and creates increased compliance even in those
who voted against the law.63  For instance, in experiments
where the subjects are permitted to vote on the fine structure
used in the experiment, compliance is higher than in a control
group where the fine is imposed exogenously.64  Further, even
subjects who vote to reject the fine demonstrate a higher tax
compliance rate than those in the control group.65  Field studies
conducted in Switzerland also support this experimental data.66
Those studies primarily examined tax evasion data in Swiss
cantons over a number of years and concluded that the more the
decision-making procedures involve direct democracy, the lower
the tax evasion rate.67  Consequently, believing that the tax
laws are legitimate, even though they may not personally be to
one’s liking, appears to increase tax compliance.
Similarly, another factor that impacts the perceived legiti-
macy of the tax law is how fairly it is administered.68  Fairness
63. See, e.g., James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Ex-
change, Collective Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 285 (1993) (finding higher compliance when a matter is voted on and when
the outcome has wide support). Accord T.R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990) (arguing that people comply with the law in general if they perceive the
process that leads to this law as fair).
64. See, e.g., James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Chang-
ing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141, 163 (1999);
Bruneo Feld & J.R. Tyran, Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis, 55
KYKLOS 197, 218 (2002); Benno Torgler & C. A. Schaltegger, Tax Amnesties and
Political Participation, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 403 (2005); Benno Torgler, What Do We
Know about Tax Morale and Tax Compliance?, 48 INT’L REV. ECON. & BUS. 395
(2001) (surveying literature on political participation and compliance).
65. Feld & Tyran, supra note 64, at 218.  It is also interesting to note that in R
an experiment where a majority of subjects vote against a higher tax enforcement
level, post-vote compliance levels deteriorate even if they had been high before the
vote. See Alm, McClelland & Schulze, supra note 64, at 163.  This provides further R
evidence of the importance of an individual taxpayer’s perception regarding how
honest his peers are in paying their taxes.
66. Werner W. Pommerehne & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Tax Rates, Tax
Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland, 88 PUB. CHOICE 161
(1996); Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Direct Democracy, 21 EUR. J. POL. ECON.
525 (2005).
67. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psycho-
logical Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 L. &
POL’Y 102, 113 (2007) (examining the periods between 1965 to 1978 and 1985 to
1995).
68. Tom Tyler & P. Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedu-
ral Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482 (1995) (demonstrating that individual willingness
17
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in this context has both a procedural aspect (was the decision-
making process fair?) and an outcome aspect (was the ultimate
result fair?).69  The result that voluntary cooperation with an
authority increases with its perceived legitimacy is a widely ac-
cepted finding in empirical psychological studies.70  The finding
is also specifically demonstrated in the relevant tax compliance
studies.71  This is particularly important in a tax system that
relies heavily on self-reporting, as in the United States.
With regard to procedural fairness issues, the audit proce-
dures utilized should be transparent and understandable to the
taxpayer.  When faced with arbitrary procedures, taxpayers
may feel the game is rigged against them and that they have no
true ability to air their positions before an unbiased party.  On a
personal level, procedural fairness requires that taxpayers be
treated with respect by auditors and other tax officials.  As dis-
cussed earlier, studies have demonstrated a cooperation or re-
ciprocation norm that predisposes people to cooperate, but that
can also cause them to seek retribution for past bad behavior.72
Consequently, treating taxpayers with disrespect (e.g., assum-
ing they are cheaters unless proven honest) can reverse the nor-
mal inclination toward voluntary compliance.
to voluntarily cooperate with existing authorities in order to solve social dilemma
problems rises with the perceived legitimacy of these authorities).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Y. Cohen-Charash & P. E. Spector, The Role of Justice in Organi-
zations: A Meta-Analysis, 86 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 278
(2001); E.A. Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudi-
cated Resolutions of Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 643
(1980); M.W. Spicer & L.A. Becker, Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experi-
mental Approach, 33 NAT’L TAX J. 171 (1980); J. Thibaut, N. Friedland & L.
Walker, Compliance with Rules: Some Social Determinants, 30 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 792 (1974); T.R. Tyler & A. Caine, The Role of Distributional and
Procedural Fairness in the Endorsement of Formal Leaders, 41 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 642 (1981).
71. See, e.g., H. Elffers, R.H. Weigel & D.J. Hessing, The Consequences of Dif-
ferent Strategies for Measuring Tax Evasion Behavior, 8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 311
(1987) (magnitude of tax evasion depends on the satisfaction of the taxpayer with
the tax system as well as the system of tax administration); Lars P. Feld & Bruno
Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated, 3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 87
(2002) (evasion will tend to lower the relationship based on trust that exists be-
tween the tax administration and the taxpayer); Werner W. Pommerehne & Han-
nelore Weck-Hannemann, Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion
in Switzerland, 88 PUB. CHOICE 161 (1996).
72. See supra note 35 (discussing ultimatum games). R
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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The fair outcome aspect of administrative legitimacy may
be conceptually more difficult to pursue in the tax area.  Taxes
are forced impositions by the government, and at the core, the
tax administrator is charged with collecting those taxes for the
benefit of the fisc.  Nevertheless, viewing the role of the tax
agency as maximizing government receipts should be rejected
as ultimately counterproductive to voluntary tax compliance.  If
taxpayers believe that the government is always going to tip the
scales in its favor, they will certainly not view the ultimate out-
comes of any audit as legitimate.  Consequently, it is important
for the taxing authority to focus on obtaining “correct” results
under the law, rather than revenue-maximizing ones.  Audit
rules should grant a fair degree of discretion to auditors so that
they are not just mindlessly applying inflexible rules without an
appreciation of their overall purpose or their impact in a partic-
ular case.73  If taxpayers believe that the auditor was really
striving to apply the law correctly and impartially, then they
should be able to grant the agency a high degree of legitimacy
even if the ultimate result is in the government’s favor.
2. Trust in Taxpayers
The other area of significant importance in promoting tax
compliance can be loosely referred to as trust in taxpayers.  Or,
viewed through the fiscal-exchange lens, are taxpayers gener-
ally upholding their end of the fiscal-exchange bargain by actu-
ally paying the taxes imposed to fund the government’s
services?  Within this rubric are such factors as whether other
taxpayers are perceived as being generally compliant, the abil-
ity to place social pressure on noncompliant taxpayers, and the
ability to create incentives or rewards linked to compliant
behavior.
No one wants to feel like a chump for paying taxes when
they believe everyone else is freeloading.74  While this fact is
easily grasped at a gut level, empirical studies consistently
demonstrate that perceptions about whether others are comply-
73. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE
PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 330-33 (1992).
74. Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.
19
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ing with their tax obligations strongly impact tax compliance.75
From a psychological standpoint, this derives from the coopera-
tion norm and the fact that conditional cooperators, while ini-
tially willing to satisfy their tax obligations, will alter that
behavior in response to the non-cooperation of others.  Conse-
quently, a society’s perception of the level of noncompliance has
a significant impact on taxpayer behavior.
Similarly, the research in this area indicates that, in addi-
tion to lessening cooperation, retaliation may also be a legiti-
mate response to non-cooperation.76  Consequently, compliant
taxpayers may exert pressure on the noncompliant to alter their
behavior.  In this regard, studies have consistently shown that
shame can be a potent factor in promoting compliance with the
tax laws.77  Essentially, society can place a certain stigma on
75. See, e.g., James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms,
and Tax Evasion in Developing and Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 146, 151 (James Alm & Jorge Marti-
nez-Vazquez eds., 2003) (“If the perception becomes widespread that the govern-
ment is not willing to detect and penalize evaders, then such a perception
legitimizes tax evasion.  The rejection of sanctions sends a signal to each individ-
ual that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax evasion is in some
sense socially acceptable, and the social norm of compliance disappears.”); Bruno
Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP.
ECON. 136 (2007) (demonstrating that tax morale decreases when tax evasion is
perceived as common in Western and Eastern Europe); Steven M. Sheffrin & Rob-
ert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Tax-
payer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992)
(perceiving other taxpayers as dishonest significantly increases the likelihood a
person will avoid taxes); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable
Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 113 (2003) (“The effect of perceptions of widespread [tax] noncom-
pliance on intentions to comply in the future may result from the norm of conform-
ity, or may simply be the product of a perceived reduction in the risk of formal or
informal sanctions.”).
76. See supra note 35. R
77. See, e.g., Eliza Ahmed & Valerie Braithwaite, A Need for Emotionally In-
telligent Policy: Linking Tax Evasion with Higher Education Funding, 10 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2005); B. Erard & J.S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral
Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax Compliance, 49 PUB. FIN. 70 (Supp.
1994); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursick, Conscience, Significant Others,
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837
(1990); Harold G. Grasmick, Robert J. Bursik & J.K. Cochran, “Render Unto Cae-
sar What Is Caesar’s”: Religiosity and Taxpayers Inclinations to Cheat, 32 SOC. Q.
251 (1991); Marta Orviska & John Hudson, Tax Evasion, Civic Duty and the Law
Abiding Citizen, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 83, 87 (2002); S.G. Tibbetts, D. Joulfaian, &
M. Rider, Shame and Rational Choice In Offending Decisions: Tax Evasion In The
Presence Of Negative Income Tax Rates, 24 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 234 (1997); Kris-
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exposed tax evasion.  Unfortunately, the ability to use shame as
an operative factor requires first discovering the malfeasance,
which may be difficult in the tax setting.  Even if a taxpayer is
found by the government to have underpaid his taxes, that in-
formation is generally not made public.  Indeed, the United
States tax laws go to great lengths to ensure that taxpayer pri-
vacy is maintained.78  Consequently, only criminal prosecutions
are made public as a matter of course.  So, the effectiveness of
shame in the tax context is normally weakened by the lack of
sunshine on the noncompliant taxpayers.79
Even if shame proves to be a less potent influence on tax-
paying behavior as a practical matter, guilt is likely to retain its
impact.  The relevant studies have shown that guilt can also in-
fluence taxpaying behavior.80  Unlike shame, which requires
some form of group shunning or stigma, guilt represents an in-
ternal force residing within each taxpayer.81  Guilt arises when
people realize that they have acted inappropriately in the con-
text of a social norm that they have personally accepted.  Conse-
quently, even if the noncompliance is unlikely to ever be
detected or publicly disclosed, guilt can be a potent influence on
behavior.82
Of course, guilt only results if one has internalized the rele-
vant social norm.  Nevertheless, the degree of the required so-
cialization might not be as great or as difficult to instill as one
could suppose.  Returning to the fiscal-exchange framework, if a
taxpayer believes that his tax burden is roughly commensurate
to the government’s public goods, he is likely to be invested in
tina Murphy, Procedural Justice, Shame and Tax Compliance (Centre for Tax Sys-
tem Integrity, Working Paper No. 50, 2004), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/
publications/WP/50.pdf.
78. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2006) (mandating strict rules to protect the confidential-
ity of tax return information and severely circumscribing the situations where dis-
closure would be appropriate).
79. It should be noted, however, that there is a tension between the desire to
publicize noncompliant taxpayers so they can be subjected to a social stigma and
the desire to create a general perception that most people pay their taxes.
80. See supra note 77. R
81. See generally JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND
GUILT (2002).
82. Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon D. Perkins, Social Behaviors, Enforce-
ment, and Tax Compliance Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REV. 39, 42 (2003) (“When someone
violates a standard, they incur a psychological cost—guilt—whether or not others
discover the behavioral violation.”).
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the bargain and would feel some reluctance to shirk his duty
when the government has fulfilled its end of the bargain.  The
recognition that a taxpayer’s failure to fulfill the fiscal-ex-
change bargain could jeopardize the provision of the public
goods to society as a whole may create substantial internal
pressures that are completely unrelated to the risk of detection
for the contemplated noncompliance.  Or phrased differently,
the existence of trust in government itself may serve to legiti-
mize the tax obligation and serve as the prerequisite norm in-
ternalization to create a pang of guilt that could promote
compliance.  Thus, the “trust in government” factors are not
only important in their own right as influences on tax compli-
ance, but they can also serve as the basis on which a significant
guilt constraint on noncompliance can be established.83
Alternatively, the required internalization of the taxpaying
norm might even be totally separate from any beliefs about the
legitimacy of the fiscal-exchange.  The mere fact that self-es-
teem is reinforced or increased by knowing that you are comply-
ing with a social norm may be a sufficient internalization to
create a compliance incentive.  This approach derives from ter-
ror management theory, which posits that individuals manage
the risk of facing the unavoidable fears that are part of the
human condition (most significantly their own mortality) by
creating and protecting their self-esteem.84  The theory is sup-
ported by numerous empirical studies.85  Consequently, merely
knowing that a taxpaying norm exists in a society may provide
a sufficient internalization for a taxpayer to comply with the
norm as a means of protecting her self-esteem as a participant
83. Jan Schnellenbach, Tax Morale and the Legitimacy of Economic Policy 11
(July 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Univ. of Heidelberg, Alfred
Weber Inst. for Econ.) (“The less legitimate the actions taken by the government
are perceived to be, the easier it is for a tax evader to justify his illegal activity
against the objections coming from his own conscience.”).
84. T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg & S. Solomon, A Dual Process Model of De-
fense against Conscious and Unconscious Death-Related Thought: An Extension of
Terror Management Theory, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 835 (1999); T. Pyszczynski et al.,
Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Empirical Review, 130
PSYCHOL. BULL. 435 (2004).
85. Empirical support for the terror management theory comes from over 300
separate experiments conducted by independent researchers in at least fifteen dif-
ferent countries. See, e.g., Mark J. Landau et al., On the Compatibility of Terror
Management Theory and Perspectives on Human Evolution, 5 EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOL. 477, 478 (2007).
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in a thriving and important society.  Shirking a taxpaying obli-
gation represents an immediate psychic cost to the individual
from the reduction in self-esteem that (unlike an economic pen-
alty or social stigma) occurs even if the action is never uncov-
ered.  So, whether the concept is phrased as guilt or self-esteem,
it is reasonable to believe that the concept could, as a practical
matter, influence behavior in the tax context.
Finally, experimental data suggests that providing positive
incentives or rewards to compliant taxpayers can positively in-
fluence their compliance.86  In one experiment, four alternative
types of compliance rewards were compared:87 (1) a lottery,88 (2)
a fixed reward,89 (3) a public good, and (4) a reduction in future
audit rates.  The alternative rewards are listed in order of their
positive compliance impact.  Of interest is that the lottery
mechanism showed the largest compliance impact even over a
fixed reward having the same expected value and over a public
good having a higher expected value.  The experimenters con-
cluded that to have a significant impact a reward should be im-
mediate and salient to the subject.90
The structure and requirements for a reward must be care-
fully considered for other reasons as well.  First, a poorly
crafted reward could have negative impacts on compliance.  If
the reward were to focus on changing the behavior of previously
noncompliant taxpayers, then it might create an incentive for
compliant taxpayers to become noncompliant in order to gain
eligibility for the reward.91  Second, insufficient empirical work
has been done to determine whether a reward might have a
86. See, e.g., James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Deterrence and
Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 311 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992); J. Falkinger & H. Walther, Rewards Versus Penalties: On a
New Policy Against Tax Evasion, 19 PUB. FIN. Q. 67 (1991); Feld & Frey, supra
note 67, at 110. See generally J. NUTTIN & A.G. GREENWALD, REWARD AND PUNISH- R
MENT IN HUMAN LEARNING (1968).
87. Alm, Jackson & McKee, supra note 86. R
88. If the subject was “audited” and shown to be in compliance for five consec-
utive “rounds” in the experiment, then she was entered into a lottery with a 1 in 25
chance of winning. Id.
89. The fixed reward was set to have the same expected value as the lottery.
So, a certain fixed reward of $1 would equate to the expected value of having a 1 in
25 chance of winning $25. Id.
90. Id.
91. Feld & Frey, supra note 67, at 110. R
23
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crowding out effect on a prevailing compliance norm.92  That is,
the incentive may merely replace the intrinsic motivation for
little net compliance impact.  However, it has been suggested
that, as long as rewards are reserved only for good behavior, a
crowding out effect is less likely because the reward is reinforc-
ing the initial positive compliance behavior (unlike a deterrence
approach where the penalty is aimed at noncompliant taxpay-
ers and functions as a replacement for the intrinsic motivation
that would otherwise encourage compliance).  Finally, linking
the reward directly with the amount of tax owed is likely to be
counterproductive.  Sliding-scale rewards applied to all con-
forming taxpayers are likely to be viewed as, in substance, dif-
ferential tax rates and may, therefore, have consequences more
akin to penalties.  Consequently, a one-size-fits-all reward is
more likely to be seen as a token of appreciation or respect from
the government rather than as an implicit tax reduction that
the taxpayer is entitled to.93  Such a gift from the government
could also be interpreted as reinforcing the fiscal-exchange rela-
tionship between the taxpayer and the government.94  This also
implies that using a non-monetary reward may provide the best
long-term results in a tax situation.95  Overall, while more em-
pirical work is required on the optimum structure for a reward
system, it seems clear that properly tailored rewards can have a
significant positive impact on tax compliance.
III. Cultivating a Taxpaying Ethos
It is demonstrable that the existence of trust in government
and other taxpayers exerts a positive influence on tax compli-
ance.  This section explores how such trust can be fostered to
cultivate a pervasive taxpaying ethos in a society, with a partic-
ular emphasis on how to generally strengthen the existing tax-
paying ethos present in the United States.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ernst Fehr, Simon Ga¨chter & Georg Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Con-
tract Enforcement Device, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833 (1997).
95. Feld & Frey, supra note 67, at 110. R
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A. Making the Law and its Administration Objectively Fairer
The forgoing discussion of the trust in government factors
indicates the importance of increasing the legitimacy of the tax
system and the deemed fiscal-exchange.  Taking steps to elevate
and safeguard this legitimacy will promote increased compli-
ance and contribute to the establishment of a pervasive taxpay-
ing ethos in a society.  Therefore, a government needs to make
sure that its fiscal choices are in line with the society’s desires,
that the tax burden imposed is equitable, and that the tax ad-
ministration is fair.
As discussed earlier, the level of voluntary tax compliance
in the United States is already quite high and indicates the ex-
istence of a well-established taxpaying ethos.96  In particular,
due to the nature of our longstanding democracy, the basics of
the fiscal-exchange dynamic are solidly in place.  The govern-
ment’s fiscal choices are determined by elected officials and are
subject to public scrutiny.  Similarly, while United States citi-
zens like to complain about their tax burden (after all, paying
lower taxes is always better), in general, the tax burden in this
country is perceived as generally equitable.97  Consequently,
while drastic changes to the tax system (e.g., moving to a value-
added tax or to a flat-income tax) might be considered by some
as potentially useful in improving compliance, this Article will
not dwell on systemic tax reform as a means for improving tax
compliance.
Nevertheless, there are a number of smaller adjustments to
the United States tax laws and administration that could help
to incrementally increase trust in government.  A common com-
plaint about the current tax code is its complexity.  This com-
plexity is especially troubling in a tax system that is premised
on voluntary compliance, which presupposes an understanding
96. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
97. In 2006, the effective tax burden in the United States was actually below
that of most European countries and below the OECD average when aggregate tax
receipts were measured as a percentage of gross domestic product. Tax Revenue:
Setting the Bar High, ECONOMIST.COM, Oct. 25, 2007 (unpublished article, on file
with author).  Further, the continued existence of progressive tax rates is generally
not viewed as unfair. But see Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness?
A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221 (1995) (arguing that progressive tax rates are inherently
unfair).
25
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of one’s obligations under the law.  So if systemic tax reform is
rejected, real attempts at simplification could yield important
compliance benefits.  While any number of specific simplifica-
tion proposals could be pursued,98 a subtle shift in drafting tech-
nique might also yield benefits.  One reason for the complexity
of the current code and associated regulations is that they must
address and provide guidance for a wide variety of economic ac-
tivity.  As a result, the Code often employs specific rules rather
than general principles.  While specific rules are arguably more
predictable in future application, they can be detrimental in
that they expand the opportunities to game the tax system by
crafting transactions to skirt the literal rule or by applying such
rules to unanticipated situations to achieve unwarranted re-
sults.99  To the extent the judiciary believes the tax laws must
be applied literally or construed strictly against the govern-
ment, the problem is exacerbated.100  Consequently, consciously
drafting tax statutes in terms of general principles or standards
may be a more prudent drafting approach.101  Using principles
or standards has the added benefit of lessening the need to con-
stantly revise the Code to address new factual situations, and
98. See, e.g., IRS, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 50, 50-51 (2007) [hereinafter TAX GAP COMPLIANCE RE-
PORT] (listing several tax simplification measures that could be adopted); U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP
15 (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp111.htm (noting
that a number of tax gap related  simplification proposals have been made or are
under consideration); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS
TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Comm. Print 2005)
(discussing numerous tax simplification changes).
99. See Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s Role in
Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 152-54 (2004).
100. See id.
101. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
860, 871 (1999) (“[Rules present] an easy target for tax planning . . . .  To reduce
this potential, rules must become more complex, and greater complexity creates
additional opportunities for planning, and onward and onward.  Standards are
fuzzy at the borders, reducing this problem.”); Richard Lavoie, Reclaiming a Tax
Code Mired in Complexity: The Use of Standards Versus Rules in Creating Sus-
tainable Tax Reform 3 (July 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor) (advocating for a principles-based approach to drafting the Internal Revenue
Code). But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of
“Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Account-
ing, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007) (arguing that a standard-based approach is un-
workable when applied to a complex statutory structure like the Internal Revenue
Code).
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therefore provides citizens with a greater impression of legal
stability.102  Principles and standards are also potentially bene-
ficial because, as opposed to strict rules, it may be easier for the
average person to understand their intent and apply that intent
to his or her particular situation.
Beyond the law itself, compliance benefits are likely to re-
sult from changes in the way the law is administered by the
Service.  As a starting point, saber rattling by the Service about
increased enforcement efforts seems misplaced.103  Despite gen-
erating positive cash returns,104 such efforts have only an incre-
mental impact on compliance at the margin and may even be
counterproductive.105  As discussed above, it has been argued
that using too much coercion harms tax compliance either due
to a crowding out effect or because it encourages taxpayers to
believe that a significant portion of the population does not pay
their full taxes.  Consequently, the Service should refrain from
engaging in and publicizing general increases in enforcement
activity.106
More generally, the Service clearly needs to reform its im-
age.  Many Americans feel that the audit process is capri-
cious.107  While the Service has taken steps in this regard in
102. Lavoie, supra note 99, at 153. R
103. For example, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service recently
stated that the Service “need[s] to have rigorous enforcement programs” and that a
major focus during his term “will be to reduce the tax gap through continued em-
phasis on strong compliance programs.” Shulman Emphasizes Continuity of En-
forcement, Service Priorities, 119 TAX NOTES 120 (2008). See also TREASURY
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES
THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 3 (2008) (discussing the greatly increased enforce-
ment efforts of the Service in recent years, but warning that “despite [the] work
the IRS is doing to improve its enforcement efforts, the Government Accountability
Office continued to include enforcement of tax laws (collection of unpaid taxes and
Earned Income Tax Credit noncompliance) as one of the twenty-six high-risk areas
in the Federal Government in its most recent (January 2007) update”).
104. As a result of increased enforcement efforts, enforcement revenue in-
creased sharply from 2002 to 2007, and was 68% higher in 2007 than it was in
1998. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVI-
TIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 22 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200830095fr.html.
105. See discussion supra Part II.A.
106. However, specifically targeted enforcement initiatives may be beneficial.
See infra Part IV.
107. See, e.g., IRS, PUB. AFF. DIV., TAXPAYER ATTITUDES SURVEY: FINAL RE-
PORT (1984).
27
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR402.txt unknown Seq: 28 28-OCT-09 14:44
664 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:637
response to Congressional prodding,108 the changes have been
subject to some criticism.109  Most of this recent effort has been
focused on procedural reforms and shifts in internal organiza-
tional structure to make the Service more efficient and fo-
cused.110  To the extent such changes result in greater
procedural fairness, they represent a positive step in terms of
promoting compliance.  Recent reforms have, however, done lit-
tle to attack the Service’s broader image problem beyond creat-
ing a greater emphasis on customer service.111  To this end
taxpayers are now thought of as “customers” and the Service is
dedicated to providing them with “good service” based on timely
and accurate responses to questions and the distribution of in-
formation via the Internet, phone, and other avenues.  At its
base, this type of customer service is focused on those taxpayers
whose noncompliance rests on legitimate confusion regarding
the law and their obligations, or those whose failure derives
from being despondent over the complexity of the filing require-
ments.  While a focus on customer service may well be useful to
such taxpayers, it likely has little impact on those whose non-
compliance is intentional.  Further, it can be argued that even
using the terminology of “customer” in the tax context is
108. In 1997, the Senate Finance Committee held televised hearings regard-
ing alleged abuse of taxpayers by the Service. See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer, Three
Days of Hearings Paint Picture of Troubled IRS, 76 TAX NOTES 1655 (1997).  In
retrospect, much of the testimony at those hearings was one-sided, exaggerated
and generally unfair to the Service. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF SPE-
CIAL INVESTIGATIONS, GAO REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF IRS TAXPAYER ABUSE
(1999); Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX NOTES
1854 (1999).  Nevertheless, the hearings led Congress to adopt legislation that
mandated an enormous reorganization of the Service and was aimed at trying to
make the Service more “customer” friendly with a renewed focus on taxpayer
rights.  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
109. See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process
and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
56 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Wm. Brian Henning, Reforming the IRS: The Effective-
ness of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 405 (1999); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed
IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971 (2003); Eric A. Lustig, IRS, Inc. – The IRS Oversight
Board – Effective Reform or Just Politics? Some Early Thoughts from a Corporate
Law Perspective, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 725 (2004); Heather B. Conoboy, Note, A Wrong
Step in the Right Direction: The National Taxpayer Advocate and the 1998 IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401 (2000).
110. Lederman, supra note 109, at 996.
111. Id.
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counterproductive since it removes the focus from the fiscal-ex-
change dynamic and implies that tax evasion by “dissatisfied”
customers is appropriate.112
In terms of promoting tax compliance, a more fruitful type
of “customer” focus would be to better modulate communica-
tions with the taxpayer in the audit context.  As discussed ear-
lier, empirical research demonstrates that trust in government
derives in part from perceptions that the taxpayer is being
fairly treated.  A crucial element of fair treatment is feeling like
you are being treated with respect.113  Consequently, the Ser-
vice potentially could promote voluntary compliance by building
a regulatory approach where the tax administrator is willing to
take all aspects of the taxpayer’s situation into account in
resolving tax questions and provides the taxpayer with low-key
judgment-free opportunities to address or correct suspected er-
rors.114  This mode of tax administration is typically referred to
as “responsive regulation” and has been adopted by the taxing
authorities in a number of jurisdictions, most notably Austra-
lia.115  Responsive regulation is generally based on a “tit for tat”
approach, where the regulatory action adjusts in response to a
taxpayer’s behavior.  The aim is for most issues to be resolved in
a cooperative manner with more coercive actions applied only to
those taxpayers demonstrating continued resistance to meeting
their tax obligations.  The responsive-regulation model requires
substantial effort on the part of the taxing authority to effec-
tively implement it.  In addition to requiring a mind-set change
on the part of many of its employees, the model is premised on
allowing substantial discretion in dealing with particular tax-
payers to dynamically encourage their compliance.  Such flexi-
bility runs some risk of creating arbitrary and non-uniform tax
administration, which could harm compliance by fostering a be-
112. Id. at 992.
113. This can be seen as an outgrowth of the reciprocity norm discussed above
in Part II.B.1 because positive behavior by the taxing authority increases the like-
lihood of compliance due to the tendency for people to try to treat others in the
same manner others treat them. See Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness:
Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 223, 225 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992). See also Dan M. Kahan, Logic of Reciprocity, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 71 (2003).
114. Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 615-16. R
115. Id. at 622.
29
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lief that the system is unfair and perhaps irrational.116  Fur-
ther, the system runs some risk of adversely affecting
compliance by being too lenient.  If people come to believe that
there are never any coercive consequences for failure to honor
their tax obligations, then they may lose faith in the adminis-
trator’s ability to effectively police the tax law against the inten-
tionally noncompliant.  Despite these implementation concerns,
the potential compliance benefits from moving away from a
highly authoritarian deterrence-based regulatory model should
cause the Service to seriously contemplate making such a para-
digm shift.117
Beyond procedural fairness issues and generally improving
respectful relations between taxpayers and the Service, repair-
ing the Service’s image requires addressing issues of outcome-
fairness.  In short, many people believe that the Service is not a
fair arbiter of tax disputes.  This perception is perpetuated by
the lack of clear guidelines for when the Service should assert
positions on audits.118  Because the standards applicable to tax-
payer-reporting positions are fairly well defined, the absence of
reciprocal standards for the Service gives the perception that
the system is slanted in the government’s favor.  This percep-
tion is exacerbated by the fact that the Service instructs exam-
ining agents to assert all “meritorious” issues, even if they
ultimately feel the taxpayer’s position is on balance the proper
one.119  Adopting clear standards for when the Service should
raise an issue would be perceived as leveling the playing field
and would also actually increase the uniformity and equality of
116. Some have questioned the threshold assumption of responsive regulation
that the tax law is sufficiently determinate so that taxpayers and the government
could in fact agree regarding when a tax is owed or whether the taxpayer is being
resistant. See, e.g., Mark Burton, Responsive Regulation and the Uncertainty of
Tax Law – Time to Reconsider the Commissioner’s Model of Cooperative Compli-
ance?, 5 EJOURNAL TAX RES. 71 (2007), http:// www.atax.unsw.edu.au/ejtr/content/
issues/previous/paper4_v5n1.pdf.  This problem is, however, mitigated if the par-
ties use a common interpretive approach. See discussion infra notes 120-22. R
117. See Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 630. R
118. Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper
Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 (2008).
119. See Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; Frederic G. Corneel, The Service
and the Private Practitioner: Face to Face and Hand in Hand – a Private Practi-
tioner’s View, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 343, 359-60 (1994); IRS, IRS Releases ‘Oral His-
tory Interview’ of Former Commissioner Caplin, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 22, 1994,
available at 94 TNT 120-25 (LEXIS).
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treatment between taxpayers.  Adopting such standards pre-
supposes the Service’s use of a comprehensive approach for
evaluating the meaning of the tax law and resolving indetermi-
nate meanings.120  Obviously, increases in perceived outcome-
fairness only result if taxpayers employ a similar interpretive
approach to that of the Service.  Because significant differences
of opinion currently exist regarding whether tax statutes should
be interpreted literally or given a more dynamic reading,
achieving real benefits in perceived outcome-fairness may be
dependent on resolving this controversy.121  Nevertheless, by ex-
plicitly stating and consistently applying its chosen interpretive
approach, the Service can educate taxpayers—and the judici-
ary—on the merits of its approach with the intent of creating a
commonly shared interpretive baseline to be used in resolving
tax disputes between the government and taxpayers.122
B. Altering Perceptions and Strengthening Social Constraints
Beyond fostering trust in government, taxpayers must also
have faith that their cooperation with the tax laws is justified
on a personal level.  To some extent, the forces impacting an
individual’s personal calculus are not amenable to government
direction.  The government cannot change the gender of its citi-
zens or alter the past events that have contributed to the forma-
tion of their psyche.  Nevertheless, there are influences that the
government can attempt to channel.  A key prerequisite for
building a taxpaying ethos is a widely held perception that most
people fulfill their tax obligations.123  A government should fos-
ter and strengthen this perception in its communications.124  In-
deed, the government should consider creating communications
solely for the purpose of communicating such information.125
120. Lavoie, supra note 118, at 13-16. R
121. Id. See also Lavoie, supra note 99, at 183-85. R
122. To the extent there is agreement regarding the interpretive approach, a
key criticism of the responsive regulation approach is substantially mitigated.
123. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
124. Mann, supra note 51, at 920. R
125. See Kornhauser, supra note 44, at 13 (recommending the Service provide R
more educational information to taxpayers, including giving each taxpayer a
yearly statement containing information about tax revenues and collections and
compliance generally, as well as personal information about the individual’s past
tax history).
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Publicized high profile enforcement actions should be described
through a lens that clearly indicates their aberrational status.
Further, discussions concerning the tax magnitude of uncol-
lected taxes,126 if publicized at all, should stress the generally
high compliance level and give context to the shortfall by dem-
onstrating the manageable confines of the noncompliance
problem.
Beyond public-relations efforts, the empirical research
demonstrates that shame and social stigma can be influential
factors on tax compliance.127  As discussed earlier, however,
utilizing this factor in the tax arena presents the double-edged
issue of bringing noncompliance into the public realm without
creating the general impression that noncompliance is wide-
spread.128  As a result, merely disclosing the identities of the
noncompliant seems ill advised.129  An alternative approach
would be to make all tax returns a matter of public record.130
126. It is estimated that the amount of federal income tax due but not paid
each year (commonly referred to as the “tax gap”) currently exceeds $345 billion.
News Release, IRS, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates, (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html (estimating the tax gap
for 2001 at $345 billion).  This 2006 report represents the Service’s most recent
estimate of the gross tax gap in the most recent year for which the relevant data is
available (2001). Id.  Given the economic growth since then, the actual tax gap is
presumably greater today.  In any event, it should be noted that measuring the
degree of noncompliance is a difficult task as it relies on making assumptions re-
garding the extent of non-filing in a system based largely on voluntary self-report-
ing and extrapolating the under-reporting by filing taxpayers based on compliance
audits conducted periodically by the Service. See generally Eric Toder, What Is
The Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007) (discussing methods used by the Service
to estimate the tax gap and highlighting various measurement issues).
127. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
128. See supra note 79. R
129. Nevertheless, some commentators have advocated such disclosures. See,
e.g., Jay A. Soledad & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Opinion, A Little Shame Might Just
Deter Tax Cheaters, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008.  Of course, disclosure of federal tax
noncompliance would require congressional action to overturn the strict confiden-
tiality rules currently in place under the Internal Revenue Code. See discussion
supra note 78.  The practice, however, has been used at the state level where more
than twenty states maintain websites publicizing the names and addresses of tax-
payers with outstanding tax liabilities.  Soledad & Ventry, supra.  In any event, it
should also be noted that merely disclosing deficiency information is a blunt in-
strument since many deficiencies may be the result of honest error.  Consequently,
in the absence of strong evidence regarding its efficacy, merely disclosing such out-
standing tax liability information seems unwarranted.
130. Obviously such full disclosure would be diametrically opposed to the cur-
rent norm of high confidentiality, but the United States has in fact had full disclo-
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While this would bring the tax arena into the full light of day, it
would face strong opposition from privacy advocates and, as a
result, could ultimately create adverse perceptions regarding
government intrusiveness that might harm tax compliance.131
A middle ground would be to allow a more limited form of tax
return disclosure information.132  For instance, it has been sug-
gested that taxpayers could be required to file an additional sin-
gle page tax return, containing limited information that would
become a public record.133  To protect privacy further, income
and deduction levels could be reported only as falling within
certain predetermined ranges, unless they represented an aber-
rational deviation from the median for similarly situated tax-
payers, in which case the actual return figure would be required
to be placed on the public form.134  Consequently, taxpayers
would have the choice of whether to publicly disclose their
outside-the-norm position.  They could either limit the amounts
claimed on their full tax return to fall within the median ranges
sure regimes in place for tax returns during limited periods of time on several
occasions before the mid-1930s. See Kornhauser, supra note 44, at 7 (discussing R
the particulars of these occasions).  Commentators have also occasionally advo-
cated for full tax return disclosure. See, e.g., Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost for Mil-
lionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy
Continuum, 18 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 951, 976 (1991) (raising the possibility of
full disclosure of the returns of millionaires);  George Guttman, The Confidential-
ity Statute Needs Rethinking, 86 TAX NOTES 318, 318-19 (2000).  Most recently,
television commentator Andy Rooney advocated in favor of full public disclosure of
all federal income tax returns in an editorial on the April 19, 2009 broadcast of the
news show 60 Minutes. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Apr. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpaQqX4xBCg&feature=player_
embedded.
131. Kornhauser, supra note 44, at 9. R
132. Israel experimented with such a system in the 1950s by publishing a
yearly register including the names and reported income of self-employed individu-
als, corporations, and wage-earners who earned more than 25% of their income
from sources other than wages. See, e.g., Assaf Likhovski, Training in Citizenship:
Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 665, 674 (2007).
The goal of the register was to publicize the reported income of taxpayers, so
that those taxpayers who underreported their income would be revealed by
their acquaintances and be subject to community censure.  It was meant to
“stir public indignation against taxpayers who had grossly underreported
their income,” to shame them and thus to increase tax compliance.
Id. at 674.  Ultimately the system was abandoned due largely to difficulties in pub-
lishing accurate information and to public resistance. Id.
133. Kornhauser, supra note 44, at 19. R
134. Id.
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or they could elect to claim the full amounts knowing that these
amounts would then require public disclosure of the exact
figures involved.135  While such an approach would likely still
garner some hostility, it would provide enough information to
make shame a viable alternative.  Also, it heightens the ability
to control taxpayer behavior through a guilt mechanism by pro-
viding taxpayers with the average expected ranges for their tax
items and allowing them to make a call regarding whether to
report a figure exceeding those ranges.
Finally, a government may be able to influence compliance
behavior on the individual level by providing incentives for ac-
curate reporting.  The use of carrots is usually a more effective
mechanism to promote voluntary compliance than the threat of
a stick.136  Again, planning with regard to the nature and re-
quirements for such rewards would be crucial.  The reward
must be of interest to taxpayers, not be tied to their income
level, and viewed in the nature of a recognition award or a to-
ken of appreciation, rather than as a rebate or reduction of
taxes owed.137  Further, the reward must not be linked to past
noncompliance or it could create counterproductive incentives
in favor of noncompliance.
While many structures could be fruitfully employed, one
possibility would be for any audited taxpayer who has a zero tax
deficiency to be honored at yearly awards dinners held around
the country.  At these dinners, one of the honorees could be ran-
domly selected for some additional non-cash prize of significant
value (e.g., a Caribbean cruise).  Of course, there would be pub-
licity announcing the honorees each year.
Such a mechanism not only has the potential to address in-
dividual compliance motivation, but also could take some of the
personal dread and stigma out of being audited.  The Service
generally does not randomly select taxpayers for audit.138  In-
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 86-95. R
137. Feld & Frey, supra note 67, at 110. R
138. The Service only conducts truly random audits in connection with data
gathering aimed at helping it measure the magnitude of noncompliance and refin-
ing its criteria for selecting tax returns for audit.  Historically, these compliance
audits were conducted under its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
(“TCMP”), which involved an audit of a random sample of 50,000 tax returns every
three years. See Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Pro-
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stead, audits are conducted based on some indication that the
taxpayer’s return is not accurate.139  While this approach is an
efficient way to select returns for audit and can markedly in-
crease the direct return for dollars invested in enforcement,140 it
reinforces the dread many people feel when notified of an audit
due to the implication that the Service believes they may have
cheated.  By conducting some percent of its audits randomly, or
perhaps conducting audits of returns where overpayments are
suspected, the Service could attempt to erode this perception.
Receiving an audit notice might not seem so bad if it is viewed
as an opportunity to prove your compliance and potentially win
a prize.  Instead of hearing people discussing how little taxes
they pay at cocktail parties, you might instead hear people gos-
siping about Harriett, who just spent a week in Paris courtesy
of the Service.  Given the large resources currently being de-
voted to increased enforcement efforts by the Service, such a
modest reward program would represent a very reasonable cost
for potential long-term compliance benefits.
IV. Combating Noncompliance by Cultivating a
Taxpaying Ethos
Part III outlined some general approaches for bolstering
the taxpaying ethos in the United States.  Regrettably, given
the apparent extent and stability of United States tax compli-
gram: Measuring Taxpayer Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255,
1261-62 (2003).  The TCMP ran from 1964-88. Id.  In 2000, the Service began de-
velopment of a more streamlined random audit program, the National Research
Program (“NRP”). Id. at 1264.
139. The indication often is identified by a computer screening process that
flags discrepancies in a filed return from what the Service would normally expect.
While the exact audit selection process is shrouded in secrecy by the Service, a key
element is a computer program called the Discriminant Function System (“DIF”)
that scores returns based on criteria gleaned from TCMP and NRP audits.  Courts
have routinely upheld the secrecy surrounding the DIF system because the
“[r]elease of this information could compromise the integrity of the IRS and its
regulatory function by allowing individuals to manipulate their DIF scores and
possibly avoid a well-deserved audit.”  Buckner v. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893, 898
(N.D. Ind. 1998).
140. For instance, the use of TCMP data at one point helped the Service de-
crease the percentage of “no change” audits (i.e., those where the Service found no
additional tax due) from 50% to only 20%. See Brown & Mazur, supra note 138, at R
1262.
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ance,141 it is likely that such changes will only modestly impact
the overall compliance level because the taxpaying ethos in the
United States is already well established.142  The general com-
pliance level, however, masks real differences in compliance be-
tween different segments of the population.143  For instance,
while the net misreporting percentage is 16.3% of the aggregate
tax gap,144 the misreporting percentage for individuals’ non-
business income is only 4%.145  On the other hand, the misre-
porting percentage for non-farm sole proprietor business income
is 57% and it is 43% within all individual business income.146
Consequently, it can be inferred that the taxpaying ethos is sig-
nificantly weaker within this segment of society.147  The signifi-
cance of this level of noncompliance is highlighted by noting
that this small-business category represents $109 billion (or
32%) of the overall tax gap.148  By cultivating a taxpaying ethos
141. See supra note 6. R
142. Of course, even modest changes could have a significant impact.  Indeed,
the Service’s current goal is only to achieve an 86% compliance rate by 2009. TAX
GAP COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 18. R
143. Indeed, evasion even varies between occupations, with car dealerships,
retail stores and restaurants typically evading the most.  Andreoni, Erard & Fein-
stein, supra note 11, at 846. R
144. The net misreporting percentage represents (1) the aggregate amount of
income that was misreported, divided by (2) the aggregate amount that should
have been reported.  The figure is, therefore, the flip side of the compliance rate, so
a compliance rate of 83.7% indicates a misreporting rate of 16.3%. TAX GAP COM-
PLIANCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 10. R
145. Id. at 13.
146. Id.
147. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1507 (suggesting “that there may be some- R
what more of an evasion norm among the self-employed than among taxpayers
generally”); Smith, supra note 113, at 236 n.12 (“In a survey of Minnesota taxpay- R
ers, we have found that normative commitments concerning noncompliance are
related to structural opportunity, suggesting occupationally and financially struc-
tured sub-cultures that are more likely to condone noncompliance . . . .”) (citing
Loretta J. Stalans, Kent Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, When Do We Think About De-
tection? Structural Opportunity and Taxpaying Behavior, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 481
(1989)).  The possibility of such an aberrant tax sub-culture existing in a society
was posited early on in the tax compliance literature. See ALAN LEWIS, THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF TAXATION 144 (1982) (“[A] tax subculture [may exist] with its own set
of unwritten rules and regulations.  Thus I am more likely to evade not only be-
cause I have friends who, I know, have got away with it (so why shouldn’t I?) but
also because evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends.”).
148. TAX GAP COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 13.  Note that this figure R
does not include $39 billion of underreporting for self-employment taxes, which
would also largely be attributable to this category of taxpayer.
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in this sub-culture, a much more dramatic increase in compli-
ance could be obtained.
Before discussing the actions that might be taken to culti-
vate a culture of compliance within this sub-group,149 it is fruit-
ful to touch briefly on several factors that have made the small-
business community more resistant to the taxpaying ethos ac-
cepted by the broader society in the United States.  The key fac-
tors relate to greater opportunity and personal disposition.
Wage-earning individuals have an average misreporting per-
centage of approximately 1%.150  Conversely, sole proprietor
non-farm business income has a net misreporting percentage of
57% and farm income has a net misreporting percentage of
72%.151  The big difference can be largely attributed to the lack
of significant withholding or information reporting for business
income.  As a result, such businesses can operate in the under-
ground economy by accepting cash payments for their services
and neglecting to report them on their tax returns.152  Further,
small-business owners can also evade taxes by comingling their
business and personal affairs.  For example, the business can
provide owners with cost-free services or have non-deductible
personal expenses paid by the business and reported as deducti-
ble business expenses.153
There is also a potential self-selection dynamic inherent in
the small-business community.  First, entrepreneurs tend to
take more risks than the general population.154  This may make
them even less susceptible than the general public to the tradi-
tional coercion-based compliance models typically employed.
149. It should be noted that most of the proposals discussed in this Part will
focus on attempts to change the prevailing noncompliance norm in this sub-culture
rather than addressing the factors bearing on trust in government since those fac-
tors tend to be more macro in nature and applicable to all members of society.
150. TAX GAP COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 13. See also Charles P. R
Rettig, Nonfilers Beware: Who’s That Knocking at Your Door?, 8 J. TAX PRAC. &
PROC. 15, 15-16 (2006).
151. TAX GAP COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 13. R
152. See Torgler, supra note 10, at 24 (noting that a significant correlation R
exists between tax morale in a society and the size of the society’s underground
economy).
153. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1504 n.268. R
154. Guido Calabresi, Commentary, The Passage of Time: The Implications
for Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 939, 941 (1983) (“In an entrepreneurial
society like ours, those who choose to be entrepreneurs can properly be assumed to
be less risk averse than others.”).
37
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Second, individuals predisposed to tax evasion may be attracted
to the small-business area since it presents greater opportuni-
ties for evasion.  That is, individuals rejecting the taxpaying
ethos may, by making similar tax-motivated choices, effectively
form a sub-culture that reflects their views on tax evasion.  Fi-
nally, competitive pressure may force individuals into noncom-
pliance.  A business engaged in an underground economy can
charge customers less due to the tax savings from not reporting
cash transactions.155  Consequently, businesses that comply
with their tax obligations find themselves at a competitive dis-
advantage and may need to follow the noncompliance norm of
the small-business sub-culture if they are to survive.156
A. Targeting Enforcement Efforts
As discussed earlier, while some level of enforcement activ-
ity is a necessary prerequisite for any voluntary compliance sys-
tem, increasing coercive measures beyond a basic level has been
shown to be largely ineffective in increasing overall tax compli-
ance.157  Indeed, excessive amounts of coercion may prove
counterproductive in the long run by reducing a society’s intrin-
sic inclination to satisfy its tax obligation.158  But, do these find-
ings apply in the context of small-business taxpayers?
The noncompliance rate among small-business taxpayers
indicates that a noncompliance norm exists within that sub-
group of the population.  Just as a taxpaying ethos, once estab-
lished, should become internalized and self-reinforcing, the
same is likely true of a noncompliance norm.  Such accepted be-
liefs are likely to be maintained by members of the group even
in the face of challenges to the accepted norm.  Phrased differ-
155. Indeed, they may also offer a direct tax savings to customers by sug-
gesting that they will not charge any state sales tax if payment is made in cash.
156. See Joseph Bankman & Stewart Karlinsky, Developing a Theory of Cash
Businesses’ Tax Evasion Behaviour and the Role of Their Tax Preparers, in 5TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMINISTRATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND FU-
TURE DEVELOPMENTS 136 (Michael Walpole & Rodney Fisher eds., 2002). See also
Christopher Bergin, CID to Employment Tax Evaders: ‘We Will Catch You’, TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 15, 2001, available at 2001 TNT 94-9 (LEXIS) (noting that with
respect to employment taxes, “some employers turn to evading taxes to stay com-
petitive in their industry. It is apparently a serious problem in the construction
industry”).
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. Id.
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ently, such stable-equilibrium states maintain themselves until
a tipping point is reached, and then the new norm becomes the
accepted one.
This tipping point paradigm derives from the psychological
concepts of cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias.  Cogni-
tive dissonance refers to the tendency of people to use rationali-
zation to bring their actual behaviors into closer proximity with
their beliefs, as a means of minimizing the incongruity of hav-
ing done something contrary to their beliefs.  So, a child ordered
not to play with a particular toy may convince himself that the
toy is not really that appealing after all, as a means to reconcile
his obedience with his initial desire for the toy.  Confirmation
bias refers to the tendency of individuals to discount informa-
tion contrary to their pre-existing beliefs while highlighting
confirming facts.159  As a consequence of these traits, people
tend to resist or disregard information that would conflict with
their pre-existing beliefs.  Ignoring these facts permits them to
continue acting in conformity with their established habit and
avoid any cognitive dissonance.  So, taxpayers with a noncom-
pliance norm are likely to ignore information regarding the in-
creased risks of noncompliance and to discount examples of
changed compliance behavior among their peer group.  If, how-
ever, it ultimately becomes impossible to ignore the reality and
they start paying their taxes, then the cognitive frame itself is
forced to change to reconcile the cognitive dissonance of the
situation.160
Because a noncompliance norm apparently exists in the
small-business community, it may take a substantial force to
disrupt that stable equilibrium, overcome the confirmation bias
and trigger sufficient cognitive dissonance to tip the culture into
a compliance mode.  While increased enforcement generally has
little impact on overall compliance in a compliant culture, some
evidence suggests that deterrence considerations may be signif-
icantly more relevant to a noncompliant culture.161  Conse-
159. C.R. Mynatt, M.E. Doherty & R.D. Tweney, Confirmation Bias in a Sim-
ulated Research Environment: An Experimental Study of Scientific Inference, 29 Q.
J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 85-95 (1977).
160. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us
Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 201 n.113 (1996).
161. Kent W. Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on Noncompliance: A Se-
quential Decision Model, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 350, 364-65 (1990).
39
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quently, targeting sufficiently increased coercive measures at
this particular noncompliant sub-group could provide a signifi-
cant portion of the force required to tip the cultural equilib-
rium.162  Additionally, while increased enforcement activity
may have a counterproductive effect when used in a compliant
culture due to crowding out intrinsic motivations to comply, this
should not be a concern when dealing with a sub-culture where
little or no taxpaying ethos exists to be crowded out.163  Further,
if the focus of the increased coercion is mainly to create a tip-
ping point, then presumably its duration can be limited so as
not to crowd out the taxpaying ethos resulting from the flip.
Based on this analysis, a targeted increased enforcement effort
should be undertaken as a first step in trying to cultivate a tax-
paying ethos among small-business taxpayers.
B. Rewarding Compliance
As discussed above, it is clear from psychological studies
that you really do catch more flies with honey than with vine-
gar.164  Consequently, even if increased enforcement activity is
undertaken as a first step in changing the small-business cul-
ture, it is prudent to leaven that approach with a bit of honey as
well.  The difficulty is crafting a reward that is relevant to the
group without being seen as a tax rebate and without causing
initial noncompliance to be a requisite for the reward.  While
any number of potential programs could be developed to satisfy
these criteria, the following approach is illustrative.
In the small-business situation, just relying on a number of
random audit selections may not yield sufficient numbers of
honest taxpayers due to the prevalence of a noncompliance
norm.  Additionally, because the norm is noncompliance, it
would be helpful to in some way promote the reward program as
a positive inducement towards compliant behavior.  One ap-
proach to achieve these ends would be to encourage taxpayers
162. Lederman, supra note 14, at 1508-11. R
163. Of course, the risk exists that even a targeted enforcement effort would
have ripple effects on the broader culture in terms of indicating that rampant non-
compliance exists in segments of the society.  If, however, the increased enforce-
ment activity is not generally publicized beyond members of the targeted group,
this risk should be minimized.
164. See Alm, Jackson & McKee, supra note 86. R
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to self-select for an audit.  Taxpayers could be told that if they
volunteer to be audited and the audit shows only a de minimis
tax deficiency over say the past three years, then they will re-
ceive a benefit.165  Obviously, only taxpayers that believe they
have correctly fulfilled their obligations would opt for such an
audit.  Therefore, to protect the Service from having to waste its
resources by auditing every honest taxpayer, the Service would
randomly select only a small portion of the volunteers for audit.
The percentage of volunteers selected in any year would need to
be refined based on the number of volunteers and the payoff
rate determined to create optimal participation, but perhaps a
selection rate of as little as 1% would be sufficient to induce
small businesses to alter their compliance behavior to be eligi-
ble for the potential reward.  Such a lottery selection method
also greatly decreases the risk that taxpayers would view the
reward as an entitlement owed to all honest taxpayers.
In terms of making the reward salient to the small-busi-
ness community, one possibility is to craft some business re-
lated benefit not generally available to a business.  For
instance, a new Small Business Administration loan program
could be developed specifically to serve as the carrot for steady
compliance.  The contours of such a program could be defined in
many ways, but might involve a government interest rate sub-
sidy, relaxed lending criteria, or speedier loan approval.  Craft-
ing the reward to be synergistic to a small business also has the
added benefit that it could serve as a counterbalance to compet-
itive pressures toward noncompliance.  As discussed previously,
if a taxpayer’s competitors are operating in the cash economy
and failing to pay their true taxes, the taxpayer is placed at a
competitive disadvantage by not also cheating.  A taxpayer may
be better situated to resist this competitive race to the bottom if
full tax compliance can yield him a competitive advantage as
well, say lower financing costs than his competitors.  Given the
potential benefits of a well designed reward program targeted
specifically at small business owners, the Service should seri-
ously consider pursuing this approach as a means of fostering
more tax compliance.
165. While the requirement could be that there be a zero deficiency, setting
the threshold slightly lower may encourage more compliance since it reassures the
taxpayer that small honest errors will be excused.
41
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C. Co-opting Agents of Cultural Change
A central theme of this Article is that efforts to cultivate a
taxpaying culture can have a meaningful impact on tax compli-
ance.  One argument that could be made against this proposi-
tion is that the culture of noncompliance in the small-business
community is so well established that it simply cannot be
changed.  This argument derives from the idea that cultural be-
liefs are typically the result of a person’s upbringing and cumu-
lative life experiences and therefore are not susceptible to
alteration by any governmental action.  It is not clear, however,
that taxpaying norms follow the same pattern, at least in the
small-business setting.
First, small-business owners are subject to the general cul-
ture that surrounds them.  Returning to the basic foundations
of a taxpaying ethos, business people are likely to have been
raised in their formative years to generally believe the govern-
ment can be trusted and that the fiscal-exchange in the United
States is equitable.  As a result, there is no need to attempt to
alter the impact of such formative influences as they already
trend toward a compliance norm.  Conversely, the more individ-
ualized influences relating to trust in taxpayers (i.e., percep-
tions regarding the compliance level of others and pressure
from others for disregarding the cultural norm) are predomi-
nately responsible for the rise of the noncompliance norm in the
small-business setting.  Specific attitudes regarding taxation
are likely to have arisen once an individual enters the small-
business culture.  The business world generally represents a
distinct sub-culture of American society.  It is common for a per-
son’s conduct in personal relationships to differ from what she
considers ethically required in a business setting.166  Here the
166. See, e.g., Gene R. Laczniak & Patrick E. Murphy, Incorporating Market-
ing Ethics into the Organization, in MARKETING ETHICS: GUIDELINES FOR MANAG-
ERS 97, 100 (1985); Michael Bommer et al., A Behavioral Model of Ethical and
Unethical Decision Making, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 265, 268 (1987) (referring to employ-
ees as “ethical segregationists” for this reason); Linda Klebe Trevino, Moral Rea-
soning and Business Ethics: Implications for Research, Education, and
Management, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 445, 450 (1992).  The situational factors con-
straining a behavior in a personal setting may not exist in a business setting, lead-
ing to markedly different behavior. See also Thomas W. Dunfee, Business Ethics
and Extant Social Contracts, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 23, 30 (1991) (“Most individuals are
concurrently members of multiple communities and, as a consequence, they regu-
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forces at work are fairly clear.  The greater opportunities to
evade taxes in the small-business setting, coupled with competi-
tive pressures to exploit those opportunities, lead to the widely
held perception that most similarly situated small-business
owners engage in tax evasion.  The result is a noncompliance
norm.167  Fortunately, these influences are likely to be of a
much more recent vintage and therefore more amenable to
change.
Second, while it is true that the government cannot change
a cultural norm just by legislating that it not exist, it can influ-
ence such a change indirectly.  Phrased differently, it is much
easier to alter any cultural norm by fomenting an evolution in
the belief from within the group than by trying to impose the
change from the outside.  A prime means for the government to
attempt to insert stronger tax compliance values into the small-
business culture is by co-opting lawyers and other professional
advisors as its agents of change.168  Such advisors can stand-up
for a taxpaying norm and, given their perceived status as ex-
perts, their views may have particular weight with the business
people they advise.169  This is not to say that advisors currently
counsel against obeying the law, but due to zealous advocacy
norms and the desire to further their client’s desires, they may
larly confront conflicting or competing ethical norms.  Coherent communities hav-
ing social contracts could include one’s professional, family, religion, employer,
nation, business generally, industry, colleagues, peers and so on.”).
167. This norm may also be reinforced by shunning or shame within the sub-
culture.  For example, painters who provide their sub-contractors with tax infor-
mation returns are often subject to informal censure within their community.  Rob-
ert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in 2 TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 76, 90 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T.
Scholz eds., 1989).
168. In previous articles this author has advocated for co-opting professional
advisors as a vehicle for inserting tax compliance concerns into an insular business
culture. See Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar
into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43 (2001); Lavoie, supra
note 99. See also Joshua Joseph, Integrating Business Ethics & Compliance Pro- R
grams: A Study of Ethics Officers in Leading Organizations, 107 BUS. & SOC’Y REV.
309 (2002) (discussing the role and effect of ethics officers in large organizations);
Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2006).
169. See, e.g., Roy D. Simon, Legal Ethics Advisors and the Interests of Justice:
Is an Ethics Advisor a Conscience or a Co-Conspirator?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869
(2002) (discussing the weight that clients place on the advice of ethics advisors in
the law firm context).
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turn a blind eye toward aggressive applications of the law.  For
instance, advisors may explain to business owners the general
rules regarding whether expenses are personal or business re-
lated, without bothering to scrutinize how the taxpayer actually
applies that standard.170
Historically, tax practitioners have been considered to have
competing duties to their clients and to help preserve the fair-
ness of the tax system.  This gate-keeping duty should mitigate
their zealousness in advising taxpayers on prospective ac-
170. The case of John Edwards, the 2004 Democratic Party vice-presidential
nominee, is illustrative.  In the course of the campaign it came to light that Ed-
wards had engaged in a tax planning strategy during his time as a trial attorney
specifically to avoid certain taxes.  A lively debate then ensued in the editorial
pages of Tax Notes magazine regarding the appropriateness of Edwards’s actions
and the advice he had been given. See Linda Carlisle, S Corporations and Abusive
Tax Shelters, 104 TAX NOTES 870, Aug. 23, 2004; Tom Daley, Edwards’s S Corpora-
tion, Medicare Tax, and Fair Share, 104 TAX NOTES 1577, Sept. 27, 2004; Tom
Daley, Edwards’s S Corp: Can We Get The Numbers Right?, 104 TAX NOTES 1310,
Sept. 13, 2004; Kip Dellinger, Edwards’s S Corp. Can Be Abusive Even If It’s Not a
Tax Shelter, 104 TAX NOTES 1092, Sept. 6, 2004; Kip Dellinger, Edwards’s S Corp.:
The Revised Numbers Are Still Absurd, 104 TAX NOTES 1456, Sept. 20, 2004; Kip
Dellinger, Edwards’s S Corp.: The Beat Goes On, 105 TAX NOTES 253, Oct. 11,
2004; Kenneth A. Gary, Despite Media Reports, Sen. Edwards’ S Corp. Not Abusive
Tax Shelter, 104 TAX NOTES 365, July 26, 2004; Michael Kulkosky, What Should
Edwards Do Now?, 104 TAX NOTES 774, Aug. 16, 2004; Harry D. Shapiro, Not an
Abusive Tax Shelter? Think Again, 104 TAX NOTES 669, Aug. 9, 2004.  While the
exact facts were subject to some dispute, a fair summary of the essential facts
gleaned from this exchange is as follows: In the late 1990s Edwards placed his law
practice into a subchapter S corporation based on advice that this structure could
minimize his Medicare tax liability.  Over a four-year period, he avoided approxi-
mately $600,000 of taxes by formally paying himself only $360,000 a year as com-
pensation income despite the fact that his efforts directly created on average
approximately $6 million of net profit each year for his corporation.  If he had not
incorporated, the 2.9% Medicare tax would have applied to the full amount of such
earnings.  This structure is widely encouraged by advisors based on the accepted
legal principles holding that Medicare taxes are only imposed on compensation,
and not on returns from capital investments.  The structure, however, while tech-
nically legal, presents serious opportunities for abuse by severely understating the
true compensation element and overstating the capital element.  Many conserva-
tive practitioners would counsel a client that in a context where services are the
key component in generating the income, the reasonable compensation element
should reflect between 70 and 90% of the total net profits.  Mr. Edwards and his
advisors reported the transaction based on treating only about 5% of his total prof-
its as compensation.  For the reasons discussed in the text accompanying this note,
such an aggressive application of the law should be dissuaded by practitioners to
prevent legal tax structuring from being perverted in operation into an abusive
transaction.
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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tions.171  Further, this duty requires advisors to be proactive in
indicating to their clients the importance of maintaining accu-
rate books and records and fulfilling their legal obligation to
correctly report and pay their taxes.  The Service can and
should undertake actions aimed at strengthening this tradi-
tional gate-keeping function by publicly emphasizing its belief
that this duty exists and encouraging the ethical bodies regulat-
ing attorneys and accountants to more explicitly incorporate
this duty into their ethical codes.172  Further, the Service should
make this duty explicit in its own rules governing practice
before the Service.
D. Exerting Pressure from the Overarching Culture on the
Aberrant Sub-Culture
As discussed earlier, the small-business community repre-
sents an aberrant sub-culture in our society in terms of not hav-
ing internalized the prevailing taxpaying ethos.  Normally in
this situation the aberrant sub-culture can be strongly influ-
enced toward conformity with the broader societal norm
through the use of shame and stigma emanating from members
of the broader culture.  In the tax realm, however, this is diffi-
cult due to the privacy generally accorded tax matters.  Even if
this restraint is relaxed by publishing information about tax-
payers with large tax deficiencies, there is reason to believe that
it might ultimately be counterproductive since it could cause
the broader society to believe that cheating on one’s taxes is
common and thereby erode a pillar on which the society’s tax-
paying ethos is based.  Consequently, directly utilizing shame
may not be an available or advisable means for attacking non-
compliance in the small-business community.
Still, an alternative means of utilizing the taxpaying ethos
of the broader culture might be feasible.  One of the contribut-
ing reasons for noncompliance in the small-business community
is the ability to operate in the cash economy, thereby leaving
the Service with no easy means of verifying the true income of
such a business.  The evidence is clear that evasion activity in-
171. Lavoie, supra note 168, at 89-90. R
172. Id.
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creases as third-party information reporting decreases.173
Third-party information reporting is effective because it creates
a structural impediment to noncompliance by eliminating the
informational asymmetries between the taxpayer and the Ser-
vice.174  Such information reporting requirements are also cost
effective and efficient because the government can rely on large
institutions to effectuate them.175  The lack of such entities as
central participants in the cash economy presents an impedi-
ment to adopting an information-reporting compliance strategy
in the small-business context.176
To be effective in reducing the ability of small businesses to
underreport their cash receipts, an information-reporting sys-
tem would need to place the reporting burden on the consumers
using those small businesses, largely individuals.177  Obviously,
this may be a politically daunting proposition.178  In order to
make such information-reporting more palatable, the system
would have to be tailored to be as simple as possible for individ-
uals to fulfill.179  For instance, rather than require the typical
duplicate reporting (i.e., sending a copy of the information to
173. TAX GAP COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 12-15 Fig. 6 R
(“[R]eporting compliance is strongest in the presence of substantial information
reporting and withholding.”).
174. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties
Play In Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 699 (2007); Piroska E. Soos, Self-
Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and Analysis of the
Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 121-22 (1990).
175. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behav-
ior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 666 (2006) (“[A] chief advantage of structural laws is
that they regulate centralized institutions rather than individuals.  Institutions,
usually in the form of corporations, are easier to regulate because they are smaller
in number, have known locations, and have significant economic incentives to com-
ply with government mandates.  Individuals, in contrast, are dispersed and diffi-
cult to track.”).
176. Id. at 679.
177. Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths about Collecting Taxes from the Cash
Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, Oct. 29, 2007.
178. Cheng, supra note 175 (asserting that political resistance explains why R
structural constraints are not employed in more areas of the law); Joann M. Wei-
ner, Shulman Promotes Transparency, Information Reporting, TAX NOTES TODAY,
June 11, 2008, available at 2008 TNT 114-5 (LEXIS) (noting the IRS Commis-
sioner’s stated desire to push for expanded third party information reporting de-
spite expected political resistance).
179. While these reporting requirements would also apply to businesses ob-
taining goods and services from small businesses, the discussion here focuses on
individuals since individuals are least suited to the information reporting task.
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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both the Service and the taxpayer being reported on), individu-
als would only be required to report to the Service.  Similarly,
rather than do multiple filings for each taxpayer being reported
on, a single form could be created to report multiple transac-
tions and be filed as an attachment to the individual’s personal
tax return.  Finally, the reported information would need to be
easy for the individual to obtain and report.  In this regard, the
information-reporting requirement could be as simple as a list
of the names and identifying numbers180 of all persons or busi-
nesses paid more than a threshold dollar amount during the
last calendar year.181  The requirement would also specifically
exclude a number of common transactions to further reduce the
reporting burden.  For example, payments made to utility com-
panies, financial institutions, religious institutions, and govern-
ment offices would be excluded.182  For most individuals, this
list could be easily compiled by flipping through their checkbook
entries for the preceding year to see which recipients received
payments exceeding the aggregate threshold.183  Of course, any
large payments in cash would need to be considered as well, but
sufficiently large payments in physical currency should be suffi-
ciently unusual that they would be easier for the individual to
recall or provide an impetus to make a specific notation about it
at the time of payment.
180. Presumably a correlative requirement would need to be created requir-
ing small businesses to provide customers with their tax identification numbers as
a standard practice.  This creates some privacy and potential identity theft issues
for sole proprietors, whose social security numbers double as their tax identifica-
tion numbers.  This problem could, however, be addressed by requiring the Service
to issue special business identification numbers to sole proprietors reporting busi-
ness income on Schedule C of the individual returns.
181. Determining the exact dollar threshold to be used would require input
from the Service regarding the level of payments typically omitted in the small-
business context.  An aggregate yearly threshold of say $2,000 would, however,
likely be sufficient to capture a significant amount of potentially undeclared in-
come while being sufficiently large for an individual to recall and report. See gen-
erally Bankman, supra note 177 (discussing some possible structures and R
implications for such a system).
182. Payments made to family members or other individuals intended as gifts
would also be excluded.
183. To make the reporting more useful for the Service, a second threshold
might be added requiring the individual to note the approximate dollar amount
paid if a second threshold is exceeded, say $10,000.
47
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The downside of using such a simplified information system
is that the information provided to the Service is significantly
reduced.  Rather than having an exact amount of income to at-
tribute to a small business, the information reporting will just
give the Service a rough idea of the magnitude of the income a
business should be reporting.  Further, there will certainly be
cash transactions that will not be reported at all, either because
the reporting individual honestly forgot the transaction or mis-
calculated the threshold or because the payment was made by
an individual whose income level did not require the filing of a
tax return.184  Consequently, the information reporting may
prove to be of most use in conducting a small-business audit,
rather than as a tool for flagging audit targets.
Nevertheless, merely knowing that information is being
provided to the Service may be a significant inducement to com-
pliance for small businesses whose prior noncompliant behavior
was based on the near impossibility of the Service detecting
cash omissions.  Further, even if the Service gets no direct en-
forcement benefit from such information, it could yield compli-
ance benefits based on forcing small-business owners to
confront the prevailing taxpaying ethos of the broader society.
Providing their tax identification number to customers and
knowing that the customers will notify the Service increases the
chances that the small-business taxpayer may experience more
twinges of guilt if they then consider omitting that income from
their tax return.  Consequently, even though enacting an infor-
mation-reporting system applicable to individuals may be diffi-
cult politically and may not even yield direct detection benefits,
184. There is also the possibility that items may not be reported due to collu-
sion between the customer and the small business. See Lederman, supra note 174 R
(generally discussing risk that collusion can defeat structural statutory schemes).
A small business would, however, need to affirmatively split its tax avoidance ben-
efit with the consumer to induce him to cooperate in the tax evasion by not report-
ing because most individual customers will obtain no tax benefit or detriment from
the reporting.  While this might occur occasionally, it seems unlikely to be the
norm.  A small business pursuing this strategy would need to raise this offer with
every client they dealt with and would greatly increase the chances that their pat-
tern of evasion would come to the attention of the Service.  Further, since most
customers can be expected to follow the general society’s taxpaying ethos, a signifi-
cant number of them would likely be unwilling to aid the willful tax evasion of a
small business in any event.
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/2
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it is worth considering as another means of inserting the pre-
vailing compliance norm into the small-business sub-culture.
E. Harnessing Competitive Forces
While creating a formal information-reporting system
aimed at dissuading underreporting of cash transactions may
be politically unpalatable, using whistleblowers would not be.
Indeed, the Service has always been willing to accept unsolic-
ited leads on noncompliant taxpayers185 and has a longstanding
tradition of rewarding tipsters out of the revenues collected as a
result of a tip.186  In 2006, Congress expanded the Service’s au-
thority in this regard by substantially increasing the potential
reward and making the rewards for fruitful information
mandatory if certain eligibility requirements are met.187  Conse-
quently, individuals who suspect that a small business is cheat-
ing on its taxes, perhaps because the proprietor stressed
different pricing if cash was paid, could turn that information in
to the Service.
The likelihood of such voluntary tips may not be great.  In-
dividuals often are unaware of the Service’s whistleblower pro-
grams.  Even if they are cognizant of these programs, they may
be reluctant to report mere suspicions if they lack any concrete
proof of wrongdoing.188  Further, they may have ongoing deal-
ings with the business which could be soured if it came to light
185. The Service even has a specific form for this purpose, Form 3949-A,
which can be used by anyone to anonymously report suspected tax evasion.
186. This authority has existed since 1867 and is currently codified in section
7623(a) of the Code and Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1. See IRS, History of the
Whistleblower/Informant Program, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=18
1294,00.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).  Under the current program the Service
has discretion whether to reward any tip leading to a recovery of additional taxes
and may award any amount up to the lesser of $10 million and 15% of the tax
recovered.
187. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, § 406(a), Pub. L. No. 109-432,
120 Stat. 2922 (codified at I.R.C. § 7623(b)).  Section 7623(b) creates a mandatory
reward of between 15 and 30% of the recovered amounts if the tip relates to a
disputed amount that exceeds $2 million and a few other qualifications are met.  If
the case deals with an individual, his or her annual gross income must be more
than $200,000.  If reported misconduct is not eligible for a mandatory award, then
it may still be eligible for a traditional discretionary reward under section 7623(a).
188. In this regard, the relevant Service guidelines require “specific and credi-
ble information concerning” the alleged tax owed.  Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B.
253, Section 3.03(7), (7)(vi), (7)(vii).
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that the individual had put the Service on the proprietor’s trail.
While customers of a small business may be reluctant to tattle
on the businesses they use, competitors of such businesses
would, however, have no such compunction.
If the Service were to increase awareness of its
whistleblower programs within the small-business community
it would have several beneficial impacts.  First, it would in-
crease the perceived risk of detection for these taxpayers.  Sec-
ond, it would alert small businesses that they could attempt to
level the playing field going forward by turning in competitors
who gained competitive advantages by pricing their products
and services with an implicit discount for their ill-gotten tax
savings.  Additionally, if a reward were paid by the Service,
then the tipping business would be compensated for some of the
potential earnings it lost due to the competitor’s past inappro-
priate competitive advantage.  Of course, under the current pro-
grams, the tipping business would still need some proof of its
competitor’s tax evasion.  A competitive business might, how-
ever, decide that undertaking some independent investigation
might be economically justified depending on the benefits that
would accrue from leveling the playing field and the likelihood
of receiving a reward from the Service.
Obtaining concrete evidence of tax evasion would still be
difficult because information regarding a competitor’s tax re-
porting is not a matter of public record.  If, as suggested ear-
lier,189 Congress changes the privacy rules to require taxpayers
to release basic information regarding their aggregate income
and deductions, then the potential for competitor whistleblow-
ing is greatly increased.  A small business is likely to have an
understanding of the nature and size of its competitor’s opera-
tions and may have direct knowledge of customers lost to the
competitor.  Using this knowledge and their own income infor-
mation as a baseline, a small business may well be able to ana-
lyze whether a competitor’s publicly disclosed tax information
makes sense.190  Effectively, the Service could co-opt small busi-
189. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35. R
190. It should be noted that the Service typically does not pay rewards for tips
based on publicly available information.  Consequently, this policy would need to
be amended to enable small businesses to become eligible for rewards for tips
based on an analysis of the publicly reported information.
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nesses to vet the public reporting of their competitors and help
the Service identify noncompliant small businesses more
quickly and efficiently.191  Further, the mere knowledge that
small businesses have economic incentives to closely scrutinize
the reporting of their competitors should act as a constraint on
small-business noncompliance.  Based on the foregoing, the Ser-
vice should place a greater emphasis on publicizing its
whistleblower programs in the small-business context and
should seriously consider revising and extending those pro-
grams to increase the benefits from any new laws requiring
public disclosure of tax return information.
V. Conclusion
This Article has demonstrated that a broad array of factors
beyond the traditional deterrence approach is necessary to ex-
plain the puzzle of tax compliance.  The high level of compliance
seen in most Western democracies is attributable to the exis-
tence of a taxpaying ethos within those societies.  While the em-
pirical research regarding the influences giving rise to such a
taxpaying ethos is still in its infancy, the central concepts of
trust in government and trust in other taxpayers clearly emerge
as major forces.  Based on this understanding of the factors that
shape a taxpaying ethos, it is possible to posit steps that govern-
ments can take to cultivate a taxpaying ethos or strengthen an
existing one.  Lastly, the Article argues that using this ap-
proach the Service could significantly reduce the level of non-
compliance in the United States by focusing on measures aimed
at flipping the noncompliance norm in segments of society that
have been reticent to embrace the country’s generally strong
taxpaying ethos.
191. Indeed, the impact may go beyond small businesses vetting the filings of
their competitors and spawn law firms, accountants and entrepreneurs specializ-
ing in doing such vetting.  This has occurred even under the current whistleblower
programs with at least one law firm affirmatively advertising on the Internet as a
specialist in bringing whistleblower cases to the attention of the Service.  IRS Tax
Whistleblower Attorneys, Ferraro Law Firm, http://www.tax-whistleblower.com
(last visited Oct. 23, 2009).  Indeed, on June 13, 2008, this firm filed a $4.4 billion
whistleblower claim with the Service, the largest such claim ever submitted.  Press
Release, The Ferraro Law Firm, Friday the 13th Poses $4.4 Billion of Bad Luck for
Fortune 500 Company (June 13, 2008), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/tax-
prof_blog/2008/06/page/3/.
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